View From Canberra: What to do in dire straits | ADM Dec 09/Jan 10

A Special Correspondent | Canberra

Should it merely try or actually succeed, the result would be pretty much the same - global economic shockwaves, considering that some 17 million barrels of crude oil exits the Persian Gulf each day aboard around 15 super tankers, a significant portion of what's needed to keep the global economy ticking along.

Even the threat of closure could have dire consequences for an economy showing the first faltering signs of recovering from the global financial crisis.

What could precipitate an Iranian move on the Strait of Hormuz?

There are a couple of possibilities, including attack by the US or Israel in response to Iranian intransigence over its belatedly acknowledged uranium enrichment program.

Iran might also decide that it had no choice but to respond to western sanctions with violence.

Should Iran decide on this course, its options become progressively more limited because of the reality that it must use or lose its major strike assets.

Whatever course Iran adopts, Australia would be in the thick of it.

In such a scenario, two principal ADF assets could be immediately available, an Anzac frigate operating in the North Arabian Sea, at time of writing HMAS Toowoomba soon to be replaced by HMAS Stuart and a pair of AP-3C Orions flying out of Al Minhad Air Base in Dubai.

Any Australian participation would of course depend on the government.

Should it decide Australia will have no part in this fight, the Orions would stay on the ground and the frigate would hightail it out of the region.

But that would seem pretty unlikely, considering the recent rhetoric over Iran's nuclear ambitions.

During the tanker war at the tail end of the Iran-Iraq war in the late 1980s, Iran demonstrated some of the capabilities it could use should it decide to cause mayhem on the gulf.

That includes swarming attack boats, shore-based missiles, submarines and seamines.

Showing what can happen when a small boat full of explosives gets close to a warship was the USS Cole, which was seriously damaged in suicide attack in Yemen in 2000.

But any small boats speeding towards a warship on the high seas will be speedily annihilated.

For this task, the Anzacs mount a five-inch gun, a pair of mini-Typhoon remote weapon stations plus assorted other automatic weapons.

A peppering with rocket-propelled grenades would no more than annoy a modern warship and even modern tankers need not be too concerned since most feature a double hull.

Iran's inventory includes a variety of shore and ship-launched anti-ship missiles including modern Chinese versions of the proven Silkworm.

One such missile fired by Hezbollah damaged the Israeli warship Hanit off Lebanon in 2006 and any hit on a tanker could be potentially catastrophic.

Here Iran really faces the choice of using or losing it.

It might get in a few initial hits but they would certainly be followed by intensive US air strikes on the launchers, any boats tied up alongside plus their shore infrastructure.

Iranian missiles would certainly test the capabilities of modern shipboard defences, particularly if launched in salvos.

This would certainly prove how well Nulka performs on a modern battlefield, potentially opening the door for additional sales of a fine Aussie product.

The Anzacs feature an air defence radar capable of dealing with just one threat at a time, plus chaff and Nulka.

It would be appreciated if the Iranians could delay any offensive actions until the Anzac ASMD upgrade is installed but that seems optimistic.

Otherwise the Australian warship will be under the big protective umbrella of the US carrier battle group and its Aegis equipped vessels.

No one seems to have a very high regard for Iran's submarines, three old Kilo boats of dubious reliability with crews of unknown competence who would have to operate in the Gulf's shallow and restricted waters.

However even an old Kilo sitting quietly on the bottom could get lucky if a US carrier group wanders too close.

US intelligence group Stratfor reckons Iran's best bet for closing or restricting use of the Strait would be though use of seamines which in any shape or form make ship owners and their insurers very nervous people.

In fact there need not even be any mines for commercial ship operators to become nervous.

All there needs to be is a press release announcing that mines are present, underlining the very useful psychological impact of the seamine.

However, the effect is better if a ship actually gets blown up and that would not need many mines.

Under those circumstances, no skipper could lightly take their chances that it was all a big bluff and a clearance effort would be required, which could take weeks or
even months.

The US keeps four mine clearance vessels in the Persian Gulf.

But under pressure to declare the Strait mine-free, or even in anticipation, the US could easily invite Australia to send over one of the very competent but so far wholly unused Huon class minehunters to help out.

Iran's seamine stash is unknown but believed to be extensive and include modern smart mines and older moored horned contact types.

But to lay a really good minefield requires time and effort and a lot of mines.

Although it looks tiny on a map, the Strait is still 30 kilometres wide at its narrowest point.

Theoretically Iran could sneakily lay mines from small vessels for a few days before anyone noticed, especially if these were modern types timed to activate at a future date.

The moment the US became aware of this, retaliation would quickly follow.

Any minefield sown this way would be limited.

As well, this area is very closely watched by among others, Australian AP-3C Orions which regularly overfly on route for Afghanistan.

In a period of rising tension, the Orions could well find themselves keeping very close watch indeed on this waterway and any suspicious vessels.