One of the more intriguing contributions to the
national security debate occurred in late October when Army chief Lieutenant
General David Morrison ventured into the lecture hall to address the Canberra
University’s National Security Institute.
This esteemed body is run by one of his predecessors,
former army chief turned academic Peter Leahy.
The event attracted significant interest, principally
because the presentation was previewed on page one of that morning’s Australian
newspaper under a headline suggesting General Morrison was asserting Labor
budget cuts would put troops at risk.
No he wasn’t, he stressed, and there was nothing in
his actual presentation to substantiate that claim. After concluding his speech,
he took questions from the floor, first responding to students and reporters.
Then came an elderly gent, his world view clearly
formed in an earlier era.
In a voice dripping with venom and selfrighteousness, he
launched into his spiel.
“You say that you are proud of the achievements of the
Australian armed forces. I want to refer to Vietnam and I put it to you that
you achieved NOTHI NG for the people of Vietnam and NOTHI NG for the people of
Australia by going to Vietnam and helping to kill some three million,” he said.
And so he continued, declaring the army of South
Vietnam collapsed in the face of the National Liberation Front of Vietnam and
that Robert McNamara, Peter Gration and Alan Stretton had all declared the war
to be wrong.
Finally reaching this century, he asked Morrison did
he see any parallels between Afghanistan and Vietnam.
“I don’t,” the general responded.
Considering the last Australian combat troops departed
Vietnam in December 1971 and he didn’t join the army until 1979, he could
scarcely be held to account for Australia’s war in Indochina. So he said he
would respond in a personal way, explaining that his father was a battalion commander
in Vietnam.
“Well shame on him,” the man interjected.
Lieutenant Colonel Alan “Alby” Morrison commanded 9RAR
in Vietnam, losing 35 men during a 12-month tour. He was awarded the DSO,
reached the rank of major-general, retired in 1989 and died in 2008. He was as
distinguished a soldier as Australia has produced and unsurprisingly, his son
saw red, as did many others present.
“How dare you sir, how dare you. Don’t you point your
finger at me, make a statement ask for my comments and then ride roughshod over
me,” he said.
Without further interruption, he proceeded, declaring
himself proud of what Australians achieved in Vietnam. The clapping from the
audience drowned out the bloke’s attempt at a followup and the floor went to a
student in UC’s security program.
This was a young lady adorned with assorted tattoos
and studs who roundly condemned the previous questioner.
“I don’t know this man but I feel I have to apologise.
It was absolutely disgusting,” she said, before proceeding to a question on
issue of PTSD. Clearly the national security dialogue can’t be seen in
traditional demographic terms.
The opposition interpreted the general’s presentation
as an authoritative warning of the peril of Labor budget cuts but it was really
an expansion of a theme he expounded in earlier presentations, such as his speech
to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in April.
This is that Australia is disengaging from long
running missions in East Timor, the Solomons and Afghanistan. The Solomons and
East Timor will likely be over by mid-2013. Afghanistan will run a little longer,
perhaps out to the end of 2014.
There will be some residual commitment to Afghanistan,
likely low triple figures. But beyond that, the period of high operational tempo
which began with the East Timor mission in September 1999 will be over.
It could be that other stuff happens but many,
including Morrison, are working on the basis that Australia will be in the same
position as it was at the end of World War Two and Vietnam, with a capable, seasoned
military with not much to do. The consequence both times was a “peace dividend”
which resulted in a diminished force ill-prepared for what actually eventuated.
For the Australian Army of 2012, there are two other
coincidental issues, starting with the money. The government’s Mid-Year
Economic and Fiscal Outlook, released on October 22, gives little joy for
defence, adhering to the 2012 budget figures through the forward estimates, although
with a modest one per cent increase in 2015-16 which would take defence funding
to $24.577 billion. Then there’s the White Paper out next year.
In his UC speech, Morrison noted that he had personal
experience of the last “peace dividend” which left the army in pretty ordinary shape,
requiring a substantial and hurried investment so it could deploy and sustain a
force in nearby East Timor. And he’s concerned this could happen again.
“As our next White Paper approaches, I do hear again
those discredited siren voices assuring us that after Afghanistan we are
unlikely to send the Army away to another foreign entanglement; that what needs
to happen is to mind our own business and concentrate on a strategy of denial of
across the air-sea gap,” he said.
“Well frankly, having been a part of INTERFET in 1999
as a senior soldier of this Army that had been seriously weakened by the
proponents of such thinking, this fills me with concern.”
Morrison said this was historical amnesia, breathtaking
in its complacency. This was the era of the 1991 Force Structure Review, which
followed the 1987 White Paper which ushered some enduring reforms including
two-ocean basing and a significant army presence in the north. But, on
expectation of no real financial growth in defence spending for a decade and
based on benign strategic guidance, it figured defence could get by with 10,000
fewer personnel, a reduction achieved through attrition.
It envisaged an army of 11,000 regulars (it’s now
30,000) configured to defeat limited hostile incursions into northern
Australia. This was a force able to defend Australia and undertake limited
peacekeeping.
Deployments to Somalia, Cambodia, Rwanda, East Timor,
Iraq, Afghanistan and the Solomons ensued. So General Morrison’s concern is
entirely reasonable. The Force Structure Review makes one other observation
worth repeating.
“Defence needs to be realistic in its expectations of
the resources Governments can provide. Historically, less than half of the
foreshadowed growth in financial guidance has been provided in Budget
allocations."
