View from Canberra: The JSF numbers debate | ADM July 2012

Of all the future conflict scenarios routinely wargamed and simulated, that pitting the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) against the US and allies over Taiwan and the South China, is where the stakes are highest and the outcome closest.

It’s also the scenario routinely held up as demonstrating the profound inferiority of the Joint Strike Fighter in the type of modern conflict some see as the inevitable consequence of a rising China seeking to assume its rightful place in the global order, facing off against the US.

This started with a Rand Corporation study which concluded that China would likely lose more aircraft but that didn’t matter too much since it had plenty more, with the advantages of hardened mainland bases and modest flight distances.

Subsequent studies have built on this theme, postulating that the key western force enablers, including AWACS and tankers, would likely be destroyed early and the major US bases such as Guam would be neutralised through missile attack. That would leave land-based US aircraft operating at the edge of their range with minimal loiter time and carrier forces carrying the brunt of the fighting.

In these scenarios, JSF doesn’t come out too well, though the F-22 does do better. On the PRC side, the advantage comes from lots of high performance aircraft, which might not be fifth generation, carrying lots of weapons.

The original RAND study made the point that quantity has an advantage all its own. The best example is the European campaign at the end of World War Two where Germany fielded superior aircraft, particularly the Messerschmitt 262 and Arado 234, and superior tanks, including the Tiger and Panther. But they were never in big numbers and they were overwhelmed by, respectively, vast numbers of P-51 Mustangs and Sherman and T-34 tanks.

In Australia, the JSF versus other stuff dogfight has been fought on and off by the lobby group Air Power Australia (APA) and its supporters on the red team and the RAAF, government and Lockheed Martin on the blue team. The most recent bout occurred earlier this year in the House of Representatives foreign affairs, defence and trade committee inquiry into the defence annual report.

This is a catch-all inquiry which allows anyone to raise any issue relating to defence, with various submissions touching on defence superannuation and closure of a rifle range but mostly JSF, courtesy of APA and kindred group RepSim, a firm which performs computer simulations and whose recreation of the RAND scenario produced an even worse outcome for the JSF and also for Super Hornet, although not quite so bad for F-22.

RepSim gave the PRC one advantage, an operational high frequency (HF) over-thehorizon (OTHR) radar which significantly negates the initial stealth advantage of F-22 and F-35. This doesn’t seem too farfetched – after all Australia has its own HF OTHR which has a classified, but on some suggestions impressive, ability to detect low observable aircraft.

The RepSim simulation of 240 JSFs up against the same number of Su-35s posits 87 JSF shot down for the loss of 205 JSF – a savage defeat. F-22 does better, losing 101 but destroying 217 Su-35. Super Hornet is obliterated with all 240 lost for 30 Su-35 killed.

So why does JSF perform so badly on these scenarios? APA co-founder Peter Goon said it was because JSF was a multi-role aircraft designed to take on battlefield missile systems that existed a decade ago. Consequently it was outclassed by new Russian and Chinese aircraft which had better performance and carried many more missiles.

As well, JSF isn’t especially stealthy with the best radar invisibility from the front.

APA’s Dr Carlo Kopp said legacy Soviet systems were being steadily replaced and the Libyan conflict was likely the last in which these faced contemporary western systems. Over the last decade, Soviet and Chinese systems had steadily improved with the US and Europe now holding only incremental advantages in some areas of radar, thermal imaging, passive radiofrequency sensors and stealth. He said F-35 limitations could not be fixed as these were inherent to its design as an aircraft intended to be affordably effective against legacy Soviet systems.

In event of all out conflict, the RAAF would be better to bulldoze these aircraft into a ditch rather than waster the lives of pilots, as occurred in 1942 when the RAAF flew obsolete Buffaloes and Wirraways against Japanese Zeros.

The RAAF of course disagrees. Well they would wouldn’t they? Air Vice Marshal Kym Osley, who heads the New Air Combat Capability program did the arguing, declaring cost within the currently approved guidance, capability expected to meet RAAF requirements and schedule a bit so-so but we will get two aircraft for initial training as planned in 2014. Then he fell back on a line that’s been heard before.

“To comprehensively rebut many of APA’s assertions in regard to F-35 performance would require release of highly sensitive US data,” he said. “As neither APA nor RepSim have access to the detailed classified F-35 data, their analysis is basically flawed through incorrect assumptions and lack of knowledge of classified F-35 performance information.”

JSF’s fundamental advantage is generally attributed to its distributed aperture sensor system which will gives the pilot God-like situational awareness – providing it works as well as it’s been billed. But that’s some way into the future yet and JSF is still only part way through its fight test program and has yet to even release a weapon.

On the other side, those who operate the advanced Soviet aircraft are a whole lot less open about their wares than Lockheed Martin. So how its vast superiority can be inferred from published images and limited technical information is a mystery to your correspondent. It may well be that good but all through the Cold War, western analysts ascribed superior performance to a range of Russian equipment when the reality was far different.

Short of a war over Taiwan, which doesn’t seem that likely as the world now stands, the best indication of the capability of a modern Russian air defence system might emerge should the US or Israel decide to obliterate Iran’s nuclear facilities.