Sea Power: Maritime matters: The Challenges ahead | ADM April 2012

Katherine Ziesing | Sydney

But the project that seemed to occupy the minds of many was the Future Submarine under Sea 1000. Then minister for defence materiel Senator Kim Carr raised some eyebrows when he announced that none of the off the shelf designs he had been briefed on were suitable for Australian requirements. Since DCNS, Navantia and HDW has been asked to submit information on their offerings, the Scorpene, S-80 and Type 214 respectively, this may have come as a shock to them.

But since the program office has yet to even make their various business cases to government in a formal way, and the relevant minister has now moved on, it may well be a moot point. One can only hope that by the next Pacific show in October next year, to coincide with Navy’s 100th birthday, that the path ahead will be clearer.

It was refreshing to hear from all three service chiefs at the same time during the conference, with Chief of Army Lieutenant General David Morrison wryly remarking that it’s rare to get all three of them in the same place outside of Russell Offices. “Firstly, Australia needs its ADF more than it needs its navy, its army or its air force if it is to possess robust military options now and in the future,” LTGEN Morris said.

“It’s about being a joint force and Army knows that. Secondly, the foundation to Australia’s national security is a maritime strategy. That has been articulated and re-articulated in a series of White Papers. But a maritime strategy is not a naval strategy, it’s a joint, indeed an inter-agency, and perhaps coalition strategy and Army has an essential role to play if that strategy is to continue to have relevance in the coming decades.”

This joint theme was again taken up by Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Ray Griggs but with a twist; Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) were an integral part of Australia’s maritime strategy given the important roles that SLOCs encompass. Communications in this context now covers a wide range of activities as 95 per cent of Australia’s trade goods are carried by sea.

“From a naval perspective the maintenance of our security and prosperity is achieved through three key activities, sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection,” VADM Griggs said. “For any small to medium sized Defence Force, these are not the purview of the Navy alone.  For some reason we have not been good at publicly articulating these elements of naval strategy. 

“All too often they are seen as independent rather than highly inter-dependent activities.  This is where much of the commentary on strategic maritime issues comes unhinged, particularly that which focuses on the balance required in our overall force structure.

“Notwithstanding, Sea Control is the primary naval task in SLOC security. It spans all levels of operational intensity from peacetime constabulary tasks, where it is as much an inter-agency activity as a naval one, through to high end war-fighting.

“It is time consuming because it is largely about creating conditions for the use of the sea - that requires sustained presence. It applies equally to major trading routes, to maritime choke points and, in our own EEZ, around our critical offshore infrastructure and resources.

“Sea control is often localised either geographically or temporally – it is about allowing the use of the sea area involved, not dominance just for its own sake - but what it needs to be effective is a balanced force structure.”

LTGEN Morris was keen to emphasise the increasingly joint nature of the ADF over individual services given the platforms that will be coming into service over the next decade, such as the LHD.

“For my part I am concerned that Army has become mired in a belief that the RAN and RAAF only provide strategic lift,” LTGEN Morris said. “This incorrect attitude limits our ability to conceive of Entry by Air and Sea Operations in anything but the most permissive environment. We cannot afford to think of the LHDs as merely a transport capability. Rather they are an integral part of a combat system with unique, and unprecedented, command and control and sustainment challenges.

“Indeed the acquisition of the LHD represents not only far greater technical complexity in the operating systems than we as a Defence Force have previously experienced, but it will introduce a far greater complexity into the joint training, scheduling and integration across and between services than we have ever needed to achieve in the past. It means that all parts of Defence activity are going to be affected and will need to adjust. But we, Army, are up for the challenge.”

There are many challenges ahead for the ADF when it comes to operating the wide range of naval platforms on the horizon and turning them into a true capability. The path ahead will no doubt be bumpy as they are bedded down but they are being seen as an opportunity to truly become a more joint organisation.