Projects: Pilot training: choose a partner – quick! | ADM June 2011
Gregor Ferguson | Sydney
At the time of writing, industry was still awaiting the draft RFTs for the ADF’s two pilot training projects, Air 5428 and Air 9000 Ph.7. The responses will tell Defence what sort of choices it will face.
When budget day arrived last month, Defence was still preparing its draft Requests for Tender (RFT) for Project Air 5428 – Pilot Training System (PTS) and Project Air 9000 Phase 7 – Helicopter Aircrew Training System (HATS). The latter will also introduce a new training system for Army loadmasters and navy Air Warfare Officers (AWO), Sensor Operators (SENSO) and Aircrewmen.
The intent of these projects has been discussed at length in ADM and elsewhere; to summarise, Defence is not happy with the time and cost involved in training pilots. In a worst-case scenario, including initial officer training and delays in the training pipeline it can take four years for a new recruit to become an operational pilot in a front line squadron – that’s a significant proportion of a typical 11-year engagement.
Furthermore the ADF needs to double the flow of fast jet pilots for the F-35A Lightning II, which is due to become operational around 2018. At the same time it wants to maintain both the numbers and quality of rotary wing and multi-crew/multi-engine pilots the system produces. The current PTS graduates around 75 pilots a year, but the majority of these are Army helicopter and RAAF multi-crew (transport, maritime patrol, AEW&C, tanker) pilots.
Discussing Air 5428, Chief of Air Force Air Marshal Mark Binskin, explained the intent of his recently issued CAF Capability Intent on Pilot Training in a speech to the Williams Foundation last year. He said, “Replication of the current pilot training system would result in sub-optimal outcomes. Our current system takes too long and our suspension rates are too high in both the undergraduate and post graduate arenas. The system produces too few Fast Jet-capable aircrew, and - by default - too many multi-crew pilots. This imbalance limits my flexibility, creates issues with the temporal management of both fast jet and multi-crew pilots and perpetuates a turbulent system containing often-significant delays in aircrew development.”
he added, “It is important to recognize the increased complexity of all of the new ADF fleet types (including non-fast jet designs) will demand more advanced skills sets across all of our graduates than is currently the case. Cognitive skills -including the ability to generate and retain Situational Awareness in dynamic operating environments and the ability to absorb and process large volumes of operational information -will become increasingly more important than pure flying skills. All of our future aircrew - not just the fighter pilots -will operate require significantly increased cognitive capacities in comparison to our current standards.
“As a consequence of these elevated cognitive requirements, recruiting and selection processes must adapt, and move away from the current focus on hand/eye co-ordination towards one which is able to more accurately predict success in the highly networked world of the future.”
Much the same could be said for the rotary wing training system which must prepare Army and navy helicopter pilots and air crew for a new generation of highly complex transport, ASW and armed reconnaissance helicopters.
Timing
One of the fixed route markers for Air 5428 is the Life of Type of the current advanced training platform, the PC-9A: this will retire in 2016, by which time a new advanced PTS must be in place. There’s less pressure to introduce a basic PTS by this date thanks to BAE Systems’ recently awarded six-year contract (with extension options) to provide the Interim Basic Flying Training (IBFT) system at Tamworth. It will be possible to provide a phased introduction of Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI) training and then Advanced Flying Training followed finally by a new basic flying training syllabus. See the news section for full details on the contract signature.
It’s possible to achieve all of the ADFs training requirements under Air 5428 using a single platform such as the hawker Beech craft T-6C Texan II or Pilatus PC-21. But many training providers argue that flight screening and early basic flying training, which sees the highest student failure rate, should be carried out on a cheaper, simpler aircraft. Similarly, there’s a growing sense within the Army and navy that a cheaper, single-engined helicopter such as the Agusta Westland AW119 or Eurocopter EC120 could be used for early rotary wing conversion before progressing to the twin-turbine aircraft favoured by Defence for more advanced helicopter training.
And the ADF also needs to provide a suitable training environment for RAAF Air Combat Officers (ACO) and navy Air warfare Officers (AWO) and Sensor Operators (SENSO) under both Air 5232 and Air 9000 Ph 7; the potential to exploit synthetic media for these specialisations, as well as for pilot training, is huge. The potential pay-off in terms of training value and cost reductions can’t be ignored.
The pilot training regimes introduced under Projects Air 5428 and Air 9000 Ph 7 need to be handled as integrated systems, employing the optimal mix of training media (which includes aircraft) to impart and embed the required motor and cognitive skills as efficiently as possible.
There’s no shortage of highly credentialed training providers able to submit a credible response to both RFTs. There’s an emerging concern, however, that the acquisition approach to Air 5428, in particular, will restrict Defence’s choice. And Air 9000 Ph 7 is only a single airframe away from being in the same boat.
Platform decisions
Defence has trailed its coat on both projects for several years, so the short list of credible platform contenders is well known. There are three twin-turbine contenders for the training helicopter requirement: the Bell 429, which is a very new design though from a very experienced manufacturer; and the well-known and thoroughly proven Agusta Westland AW109 and Eurocopter EC135.
For Air 5428 there are only two serious contenders: the T-6C and the PC-21.
Recognising this, Raytheon moved early, announcing exclusive teaming agreements with Bell for Air 9000 Ph 7, and with Hawker Beechcraft (joined more recently by BAE Systems) to offer the T-6C in Air 5428.
Other bidding teams for Air 9000 Ph 7 have also emerged: BAE Systems has teamed with CAE and Agusta West-land – but the AW109 is also available to other bidders, though not on the same friendly terms; Boeing Defence Australia has teamed with Thales Australia while Lockheed Martin has teamed with Bristow Helicopters; neither of the last two have selected their training aircraft as yet and both are evaluating contenders, including the EC135 and AW109. Eurocopter hasn’t ruled out making its own bid as a prime contractor. In any case there’s no reason to believe that credible training providers will be left stranded without a suitable aircraft to support a competitive bid.
That’s not the case in Air 5428.
While Pilatus could, in theory, make the PC-21 available to all the other bidders, it’s too small to be comfortable supporting multiple ‘chinese-walled’ bids and at the time of writing was inclined more towards selecting a single bidding partner once it has seen the draft RFT (due before mid-year). This would leave the other potential contenders without an aircraft: Boeing; Thales; Lock-heed; CAE; and probably others – smaller firms with vital specialist ‘smarts’ in simulation, or classroom instruction or part-task training and the like.
In effect, Defence would be forced to choose between training providers chosen to some degree by the platform manufacturers. While this would still represent a genuine competition between two credible contenders, it narrows the competition significantly – and that narrowing process will be outside the control of the Commonwealth.
As an exasperated training firm told ADM, a PTS is more than just a fleet of aircraft and synthetic trainers. It is an integrated system employing a mix of classroom and synthetic instruction and aircraft (and all the associated logistics) to deliver the best training outcome with reasonable value for money. While the choice of training aircraft shapes the PTS to an undeniable degree, it’s still only a component of the mix. If the ADF wants to increase the number of pilots graduating from its Pilot Training System it needs a genuine systems approach and the widest possible choice of good ideas and credible training services.
Teaming
Other nations which have run similar competitions have sought to compete the PTS and platform aspects separately, getting the benefits of competition at two different levels. There’s a view among some industry players that Raytheon’s exclusive arrangement with Hawker Beechcraft is anti-competitive and works against the best interests of the Commonwealth.
Raytheon would probably (and rightly) disagree – it has made no secret of its partnership with Hawker Beechcraft, and was the first HATS contender to announce a teaming agreement with a helicopter manufacturer. It’s arguable that the rest of the industry was caught napping, but Defence may not have considered the implications of Raytheon’s perfectly legitimate arrangements until late in the piece.
Muted voices are starting to argue that if Defence wants to seek the best overall PTS in Air 5428, competing the aircraft element separately, or even requiring all aircraft manufacturers to make their platform available to all PTS contenders, would level the playing field appropriately.
Could this be done – assuming Defence feels it ought to do so? Re-casting the tender process to separate platform from training system, or simply instruct all platform manufacturers to make their aircraft freely available to all training providers, would incur a delay. It might also incur a protest from Raytheon or Hawker Beechcraft – and that would almost certainly result in some sort of delay while the probity of such a move is argued.
Ensuring the playing field is kept level may require a significant amount of time while revised tender arrangements are hammered out; industry would be put to considerable expense, and so also would the Commonwealth. Can defence afford a delay? That’s debatable: by 2016 it must have an advanced PTS in place, with aircraft, ground-based media, trained instructors (and that’s one of the most important critical path items) and a logistics system all ready to start training future fast jet pilots. It’s up to Defence to determine how tight this schedule is and how much flexibility it may have in reconsidering its approach – that is, if it feels it needs to in the first place.
The HATS project suffers a similar imbalance between the number of aircraft and number of credible PTS contenders, but the AW109 is available to all contenders and this may be true also of the EC135.
A challenge?
At the time of writing none of the PTS contenders had shown any sign of challenging Raytheon’s arrangement, though the delay in getting the required draft RFT to the Minister for approval has caused some to wonder.
If the Air 5428 acquisition strategy stays the same Defence will need to trust that market forces can ensure a strong team builds around the PC-21 and that both teams responding to the RFT are capable of delivering the quality and quantity of pilots required. It’s unlikely Defence will get a bad result, but it risks foregoing the best result and it won’t have had the control over the process that the ADF (and taxpayer) will probably feel is their due.