Projects: Is the JLTV program unravelling | ADM June 2011
Tom Muir | Canberra
Back in 2008, many saw Australian participation in the US-led Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program as a no brainer. Australia could source 1,300 or so protected light vehicles, suited to both country’s interoperable needs, from a production run of 50,000 with all the cost benefits of scale production. But concerns about the program continue to emerge…
That year, at the Land Warfare Conference held in Brisbane, then defence minister Joel Fitzgibbon announced first pass approval for Phase 4 of Project Land 121 (Overlander) that aimed to replace some of the ADF’s 4,200 Land Rovers with a fleet of protected light mobility vehicles.
He said the vehicles to be acquired under Phase 4 would perform a number of important combat support roles, including command, liaison and light battlefield resupply. The vehicles would be supplied to army combat units and designed to operate successfully in future conflict environments. He then said that Australia intended to participate in the technology demonstration phase of the US Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JTLV) Program, which was expected to replace over 60,000 vehicles in the US army and Marine Corps from 2012 onwards.
“Through the JLTV Program, Australia and the US will be devoting considerable resources to developing a light mobility vehicle with the best possible protection for our troops on operations,” Fitzgibbon said.
a final decision on whether Australia would acquire the JLTV would be made once the vehicles had passed key development and testing milestones, then likely to be met in 2010 and that the project would also engage with industry to explore other options to provide protected light mobility vehicles.
acceding to heavy industry lobbying for a locally manufactured alternative to the JLTV option, in June 2009 Defence released a request for proposal (RFP) for a locally manufactured and supported (MSA) vehicle with a minimum of 50 per cent of the production or manufacturing costs incurred in Australia and the in-country logistics infrastructure necessary for life of type support for the proposed PMV-L capability.
There were now three acquisition options for this phase: JLTV, MSA, and a ‘current generation market available’ PMV-L option. In May 2010 it was announced that there were three new competitors for the Phase 4 PMV-L requirement under the MSA option. They were:
- Thales Australia (Hawkei 4x4),
- General Dynamics Land Systems (Eagle IV 4x4), and
- Force Protection Europe (Ocelot 4x4).
Under development contracts worth some $9 million each, the three MSA contenders would deliver two prototypes by late-February 2011 for testing at Monegeetta, which would ensure they were at the same technology readiness level as the JLTV vehicles. Sure enough, by 25 February 2011 all three contenders had delivered their prototypes each to Defence for their evaluation and reliability and maintainability (RAM) trialling.
Over in the US, three industry teams were selected by the Pentagon for JLTV’s first Technology Development (TD) phase with 27 month technology development contracts awarded to:
- AM General and General Dynamics (GTV)—US$45 million;
- Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems (Lockheed Martin Owego)—US$35.9 million;
- BAE Systems – Navistar (BAES Ground Systems)—US$40 million.
Australia’s participation cost $40 million, to cover the production of right hand operation (RHO) prototypes by each of the three JLTV contenders. These were designed to be highly compatible with the US variants, ensuring interoperability between forces, yet tailored specifically to meet the needs of Australian troops.
The JLTV RHO prototypes were delivered from mid-2010 to the Australian Army for the five-month long test and evaluation for RAM and ballistic testing at Monegeetta. This was part of the wider JLTV testing program and the Australians also took the opportunity to conduct some of their own testing.
While Defence has released no official information on the outcome of the Monegeetta tests of the JLTV and the MSA prototype vehicle designs, we do know that none of the prototypes delivered by the three JLTV contenders met all of the needs of the US Army and the Marine Corps. According to the US Army’s product manager for JLTV, every prototype design was between a few hundred and 500 kilograms too heavy.
JLTV’s next phase
The next major JLTV milestone, the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase, as well as focussing on risk, supportability, and affordability, will demonstrate system integration, interoperability, transportability, reliability and utility.
A request for proposals is expected to be issued in the last quarter of 2011 with two EMD contracts awarded in early to mid¬2012. Due to changed Army requirements, the EMD phase will now last 48 months before a low-rate initial production contract is awarded in the second quarter of 2016.
Information from the TD phase has changed the scope of requirements for the EMD phase and a TD solution is not being carried into EMD. The program learned through the TD phase that initial categories and sub-configurations were not properly aligned with JLTV needs requiring further design effort in the EMD phase. Examples included limited space for mission equipment, delivered vehicles were ten per cent above predicted weights and the four-passenger designs were unable to meet medevac functions.
A major change between the TD and the EMD phases is the elimination of one of the variants, which proved to be too heavy to meet the required transportability weight. Now there will be only two variants—a Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) that can transport four passengers and carry 1,600 kilograms and a Combat Support Vehicle (CSV) that can transport two passengers and carry 2,300 kilograms.
Rather than prototypes or production models, the EMD phase will require detailed CAD models of JLTV EMD designs that would enable US Government engineers to evaluate sub-system and component design approaches, verify dimensions, material selection, and make estimates on weight.
Australian participation
There appears to be some optimism that Australian participation in the program will continue and to this end potential contenders for the EMD phase have been advised of ADF requirements for 1,300 RHO vehicles in both categories. These comprise 850 General Purpose, 50 Command and Control on the Move, 400 Utility and 1,288 Australian trailers. Australian specific requirements for JLTVs configured to RHO mainly relate to Australian Design Rules (ADR) compliance. The JLTV Program office has also released specifications for RHO vehicles.
It is anticipated that the EMD request for proposals will likely seek RHO variants in both categories with Australia presumably liable for any additional design or other costs as part of its price for participation, should that eventuate. US industry has also been advised that Australia desires to negotiate and execute Australian Industry Capability (AIC) and Global Supply Chain (GSC) deeds with successful EMD contenders.
ADM understands that the business case seeking government approval for Australia’s participation in the EMD phase is still in development and must now take into account the possibility of JLTV vehicles not being available for comparison against the MSA prototypes until around 2016-17 and, despite a substantial production run, program delays appear to be impacting on costs.
It must also take account of the possibility that the JLTV program may be scrapped in favour of an off-the-shelf (OTS) solution vide a request for information released by the US Army in May for JLTV OTS solutions that could contend with prototypes already produced by three teams under their TD contracts.
“The RFI was released to gather information as part of our market research which is required to support our milestone B decision,” according to JLTV spokeswoman Ashley John. “We are simply looking to see if there are any other OTS vehicle solution(s) that we may not have already explored to ensure we understand the ‘art of the possible’ that industry has to offer.” To this end, Oshkosh Defense has signaled that they are interested in the prospect as is Force Protection potentially.
According to a 10 March 2011 Congressional Research paper on the JLTV, the US Marine Corps have expressed reservations with the JLTV because, at its current estimated weight, it does not lend itself to Marine Corps expeditionary operations. The Marines do not rule out removing themselves from the program and modifying HMMWVs if developers cannot address their specific requirements.
The report says that the US Army is said to be ‘moving ahead’ with the JLTV program, appearing less concerned than the Marines about transportability requirements. Some describe the Army and Marines as ‘striking out on a separate path’ with the Army more concerned with survivability and the Marines concerned that heavier JLTVs could cause weight problems on the Navy’s amphibious ships.
So far the US DoD has not publically assigned a definitive cost to the JLTV program, suggesting that it is too early in the development process. Currently, the per unit cost is estimated at about US$320,000 per vehicle—a figure that the Marines believe is too high.
To make an informed choice between the MSA and JLTV options, Defence had aligned its decision-making milestones with those of the Pentagon, with the Intermediate Pass approval deciding in mid¬2011 which of the three MSA contenders would go forward to a competitive tender.
But if Defence was expecting that its evaluation of tenders for the MSA option would lead to a preferred solution about the time that a winning tender from JLTV would emerge, it was wrong. The EMD milestones, from contract award to completion, have been extended to 48 months, which means that a JLTV candidate may not be available for comparison until around 2016. The parallel paths of development that the Australian project office speaks of are looking increasingly divergent.
Market available option
According to the Defence Capability Plan, solicitation documentation will be developed for a ‘current generation market available’ PMV-L. This will be done in parallel to the development of the JLTV and MSA Options.
Under this ‘market available’ option the specifications for the PMV-L will be identical to those sought under the MSA option with the exception of the requirement for local manufacture. They would nevertheless require to be supported locally in terms of maintenance facilities, technical support, technology transfer and so on.
The market available, military-off-the-shelf approach, can be seen essentially as a hedge against either or both of the other two options failing to produce the PMV-L capability sought. It is understood that the market for vehicles of this type is being continuously monitored and if this option is eventually pursued, the net may well be cast wider than those currently under consideration for the MSA option.
While there will be some cost advantages with this market available option compared to local manufacture, neither can match the economies of scale potential that comes with the JLTV’s production run for the US military. Hence Defence’s understandable willingness to accept the delays that are emerging as the JLTV program moves into its next phase.
However, were the Marines to pull out of the program and if the US Army decides to reduce its JLTV requirements in favour of other MRAP vehicles, or as their OTS option looms, the JLTV option ceases to be a no-brainer. Perhaps the business case for further participation in the US program recommends a ‘get-out’ clause in the fine print and possibly a refund in the finer print…