Project Review: Future Submarine takes shape at SIA meeting | ADM Dec 2010/Jan 2011

Unsurprisingly, the Defence White Paper’s plans to double Australia’s underwater fleet struck no opposition at the annual conference of the Submarine Institute of Australia (SIA).

Julian Kerr | Sydney

Instead, attendees from Australia, US, UK, Singapore, France, Germany, Sweden and Spain heard Defence Minister Stephen Smith describe the decision to “assemble” 12 large submarines in South Australia as a defining element of Australia’s future defence, a sentiment echoed by other speakers.

Amidst the generalities necessarily surrounding a long-term program less than two years old, concerns were expressed about negative public perceptions, while numerous references to the imperatives of range and endurance clearly reinforced resolve to avoid the MOTS (Military off-the-Shelf) option for the Collins class fleet.

Setting the strategic scene Paul Dibb, a former deputy secretary of defence and author of the 1987 Defence White Paper, saw the balance of power in Asia shifting dramatically, with Australia needing to do more to defend itself from the growing military capabilities of potential adversaries in its own region.

“This means that we will need to move away from our obsession with Army expeditionary forces and fighting yesterday’s wars.

“Our strategic future requires a larger submarine force as well as a potent air force.

“We do not require two 27,000 tonne amphibious assault ships that will require protection by most of our surface, subsurface and combat air patrol forces so they can put a token land force ashore,” he stated.

However, a concerted move to undermine the White Paper’s proposals for 12 large, locally-built submarines was coming not only from former Army chiefs, but also from those “who believe incorrectly that the Collins class submarines were an unmitigated disaster and that in future we should buy smaller off-the-shelf boats from overseas.

“The Australian Treasury Department has brought into this argument lately by attempting to convince the Government that buying our military equipment from overseas will save money.

“I find these arguments unconvincing and against Australia’s national interests.

“But, mark my words, they have significant support – including with some of our politicians, as well as in parts of the Defence Materiel Organisation.”

Rear Admiral James Goldrick, Commander of the Australian Defence College and an anti-submarine specialist, pointed out that submarines were not only able to fulfil the roles of sea denial, sea control and maritime power projection, but could also act as potential signals of resolve, “signals which have the advantage of determination but which do not irrevocably commit a Government to the use of force in an uncertain situation”.

Here, as with other roles, range and endurance were vital, with endurance being not simply a matter of fuel capacity, but one which involved other factors ranging from food, spare parts and mean times between failures of key systems, to individual and collective human stamina.

The strategic weight created by the availability of multiple submarines could be enough to either confine or completely eliminate an adversary’s options or to create an unacceptable degree of risk in executing them, he added.

Also dealing with the issues of range and endurance, the Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Russ Crane, described Australia’s requirements as unique and said they would probably be the driving factor in the choice of the future platform.

Pointing out that submarines in the future navy would constitute just over 50 per cent of the major naval combatant force, VADM Crane said the expanded fleet would allow the deployment for four submarines to defend Australia’s approaches, to protect and support other ADF forces and to undertake strategic submarine operations simultaneously in a crisis or conflict.

VADM Crane recalled he had told the SIA in 2008 that submarine capabilities were not so overwhelmingly superior that their numbers should be increased at the expense of a balanced fleet.

Conversely, now he would argue strongly against reducing submarine numbers to return the surface ship fleet to the level of capability he believed would be ideal given their versatility across the full span of maritime operations.

Extending the roles of the future submarines to land strike and mine warfare would be a challenge, he said.

“First, there will be a considerable technical challenge in incorporating all of these weapon and sensor systems into the future platform.

“But beyond that there will be an operational challenge in deciding how best to employ a submarine that can contribute across so many areas of warfare.

“Mission design will drive weapon load-out and will be critically affected by the submarine’s weapon stowage arrangements and capacity.

“For example, a submarine specifically loaded for an offensive mining mission would be likely to carry a reduced load of torpedoes, impacting its ability to conduct maritime strike against adversary submarines or ships.”

What was clear was that the selection of hulls, sensor and weapon systems could not occur in isolation.

Although air independent propulsion was already a hot topic, it could not be considered out of context.

Australia’s strategic needs, summed up as range, endurance, crew and systems, must set the design parameters and the best choices must balance all of those factors.

Meanwhile building up the submarine workforce was on track, with 93 per cent of the recruitment target met in 2009-2010 and the return of nine discharged members saving $4.4 million in training costs.

A reference by VADM Crane to the recent 25 per cent increase in the size of Collins’ crews to allow a more sustainable workload was later taken up by Commodore Steve Davies RAN, Director-General of Submarine Capability.

“We should never have accepted the reduced crew size first proposed for the Collins class and it’s taken us 15 years since Collins’ crew was first formed to correct that,” CDRE Davies told the conference.

“During that time we’ve done real damage to our capability by allowing overload and burnout which led to unsustainable separation rates.

“We can never let that happen again.”

CDRE Davies also touched on the dichotomy between the covert nature of the submarine capability and the increasing openness expected of Defence.

“Our reticence to talk about submarines is seen as hiding failure – which leads to more determination to gain information through FOI and other sources,” he said.

“On the one hand the Australian people seem to accept the need for a capability that relies 100 per cent on stealth for its success, but at the same time they want to know everything about it.”

Pulling the threads together, Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt, head of the Future Submarine program, said the predominantly negative public perception of the Collins class was colouring the environment within which the Chief of Navy would have to advise Government about its replacement.

“It may be the biggest single influence on the minds of the decision makers.

“While the Collins experience remains an unmitigated disaster in the national psyche, the chances of them making balanced decisions are reduced,” he commented.

The three potential acquisition paths were Military off the Shelf (not Modified off the Shelf, he emphasised), an evolution of an existing boat, or a new design to meet Australia’s particular needs.

While MOTS submarines were unquestionably very good they were all about two-thirds the size of Collins, with a commensurately smaller payload and, critically, growth potential.

They also accommodated about half the crew, a key factor in understanding their endurance, which was as much to do with people as fuel.

“We must realise that what are seen as extraordinary demands on submarines of the MOTS size and concept are ‘business as usual’ for us,” RADM Moffitt added.

Additionally, buying MOTS would provide an ‘export version’ that might be less capable than the parent’s own version, with the freedom to use the associated IP as desired likely to be constrained.

Evolving an existing submarine, as was done in reaching the Collins design, was a very real option and would be evaluated.

“We know Collins better than any other submarine, with all its warts and all its strengths,” RADM Moffitt said.

“And it was designed specifically for Australia’s unique requirements, unlike the other MOTS submarines.

“We may well decide there are good reasons not to follow this path, but the idea that the Collins problems are irremediable is not one of them.”

Developing a new design suiting Australia’s specific needs could probably not be carried out independently, but Australia had been in this situation before.

If national strategy was to establish Australia’s own submarine enterprise, growing a sufficient level of domestic design capability might be sensible.

After all, Sweden had maintained a submarine enterprise over a long period to meet its own requirements, doing so with a labour force half the size of Australia’s, a slightly lower per capital income and a smaller human development index.

The ultimate choice of platform would depend on Australia’s national objective, the strategy for achieving that objective, the risks, and the nature of the help available.

Success would require wholehearted national commitment from the start and a steely resolve until the end.

“Sea 1000 will take some guts if we hope to get out of it what we want,” RADM Moffitt concluded.

Surprisingly, the Future Submarine schedule was not a major discussion point at the conference, an omission that concerned SIA President Peter Horobin, in previous incarnations commanding officer of three Oberon class boats and an industry adviser to the Submarine Capability team.

“The concern within SIA is that the (Future Submarine) program is late,” Horobin said.

“My personal view is that we’ll have to extend the life of the six Collins boats by another cycle, about another five years, to maintain the number of hulls in the water.

“We also need to spend more than we are at the moment on support for Collins.

“There have been arguments that support for Collins has been expensive, but the reality is we haven’t spent enough.”