Land Force: A good RAP for force protection | ADM Feb 2010

One of its mechanisms for achieving this is the Rapid Acquisition Program (RAP).

Gregor Ferguson | Sydney

On 26 November last year the Minister for Defence, Sen. John Faulkner, told the Senate he had ordered "a comprehensive Force Protection Review" earlier in the year.

This was completed in October 2009 and Faulkner reported its findings to the National Security Committee of Federal Cabinet in November; Defence is now working to implement the outcomes "as a matter of priority", Faulkner told the Senate.

"In connection with this review, I have also asked Defence to develop options to deploy a Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar capability in Oruzgan Province as a matter of the highest priority."

While no plans had been disclosed at the time of writing, the mechanism for delivering this capability is likely to be the Rapid Acquisition Program (RAP), a process formalised only as recently as 2005, and which has proven an effective means of meeting the urgent needs of ADF warfighters in the field.

Between 2005 and 2007 some $250 million-worth of equipment a year was procured under RAP arrangements, according to Colonel Mark Harnwell, the DMO's Director of Operations and Liaison, who coordinates all rapid acquisition of materiel.

Harnwell told ADM that in 2008-9 this had risen sharply to $400-500 million a year, no doubt reflecting the stronger ADF focus on Afghanistan and the evolution of Taliban threats and tactics in Oruzgan Province.

While many of the RAP projects are classified, Harnwell pointed out a couple of high-profile success stories.

One was the astonishingly quick turnaround by Australian industry (led by General Dynamics Land Systems) of bar armour kits for the Army's ASLAVs in Iraq.

The order for this equipment went out shortly before Christmas 2005 and after an intense burst of effort over the holiday period, the first deliveries began early in 2006.

A year later, when the decision was taken to deploy a detachment of CH-47D Chinooks to Afghanistan, a joint team of defence and contractors worked over Christmas to fit the aircraft with new ballistic protection, Miniguns for direct fire support and other self-protection systems.

The big challenge here was the integration and airworthiness aspect, and this was successfully tackled in time to get the helicopters into theatre on schedule.

Similarly, the Army's Reconstruction task Force (RTF) in Oruzgan Province needed protected engineer equipment to support civil engineering tasks; this was procured, and then armour kits designed and installed by Thales.

Risk minimisation
This is a feature of many RAP projects, according to Harnwell: while the intent is generally to buy COTS or MOTS equipment in order to field the improved capability as quickly as possible, there's generally some level of platform integration required.

The challenge here is to minimise the risk, and select the integration contractor carefully.

The process appears to have delivered what its creators intended.

Other well-documented RAP acquisitions include Javelin missiles and M19 40mm grenade launchers for the Army, Soldier Personal radios, and things like protected accommodation modules which afford higher levels of protection against Taliban rockets, mortars and direct fire weapons.

The RAP program replaced the previous ad-hoc process of acquiring urgently-needed equipment which had emerged following the East Timor deployment in 1999.

The original Defence Instruction establishing a RAP mechanism was issued in March 2005 and was renewed with a second Defence Instruction in February 2008.

The aim of the RAP program is satisfy an urgent equipment requirement within 12 months or less, according to Harnwell who has headed the program since March 2005.

By definition, a RAP is designed to satisfy a capability deficiency in-theatre, so isn't necessarily a "fast-track" purchase of equipment already in the DCP.

That said, part of the RAP guidance is that elements of DCP projects can be accelerated and the capability acquired using funds originally budgeted for that project.

But if a project lies in the out years of the DCP, the sensible approach is to treat the RAP as a separate project and follow the normal COTS/MOTS path.

And what is that path?

The requirement typically emerges in-theatre: sometimes at individual soldier level, sometimes as a result of intelligence gathered about threats and enemy tactics and equipment.

The requirement may be for something all-new, or for an item of equipment currently being used by a coalition partner who faces a similar operational threat or challenge.

The requirement is passed up the chain of command, and undergoes a filtering process (or sanity check) at each stage: first to the unit, then to HQ Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), and then to the relevant capability manager - typically the Chief of the Service concerned.

Army focus
Some 95 per cent of all RAPs are raised for Army, including items such as clothing, webbing, body armour and helmets; but there have been some significant ones for the RAAF and RAN also: the Navy has acquired additional Phalanx Close-In Weapons Systems (CIWS) for close protection of surface ships against various forms of attack, while the RAAF's recent purchase of the Heron UAV was also a RAP.

If the RAP proposal gets Capability Manager endorsement it is included in a Ministerial Submission, goes to the CDF and Secretary of Defence for their endorsement and then to the Federal Cabinet.

Approval then results in funding for the RAP from the Dept of Finance and Deregulation (DOFD).

While this process is under way the DMO concurrently engages with the customer to scope out the requirement and identify the costs.

It also identifies potential suppliers for the equipment in question and provides commercial and risk advice to the customer.

Much of this advice comes through the various Systems Project Offices (SPO) who understand their own technical and business domains pretty well and have a good feel for who (and how credible) the various industry players are.

The DMO seeks realistic price and delivery data from the suppliers and presents options to the customer, who then makes his choice based on cost and availability.

Most of the equipment is then delivered to the field, with only a small element left in Australia for training and familiarization purposes.

Some 40-50 per cent of all RAPs are sole-sourced, according to Harnwell, though the DMO does try to conduct competitive tenders where it can.

For example, a recent requirement for combat net radios lent itself to a competitive tender because there were a number of credible suppliers in the marketplace.

But a separate requirement to field IED counter-measures resulted in a sole-source purchase of these and a sole-source contract with the vehicle manufacturer to integrate the equipment onto the vehicle.

The hidden danger with RAPs is that they can accrete a very diversified fleet of equipment which could become a logistical nightmare in later years.

This risk is understood by the DMO and the broad intention (with sensible exceptions) is that equipment acquired under a RAP contract won't enter service in sufficient numbers, and remain in service for long enough, to distort the ADF's medium and longer-term procurement planning.

The exact number of RAPs varies from year to year, Harnwell told ADM.

If it can do so without delaying the project, the DMO tries to aggregate requirements into bigger packages to simply the ministerial and cabinet approval processes.

In June 2008, for example, one RAP requirement had no less than 66 ‘serials' against it, comprising a mix of weapons, radios, vehicles and laser rangefinders worth some $78 million total.

About 50 per cent of all RAP purchases are sourced from overseas - typically from Australia's US, UK and European coalition partners in Afghanistan.

Much of this equipment comes through the local subsidiaries of northern hemisphere primes.

The balance of MOTS and COS equipment favours the former, he believes, and there is very little developmental work done on the baseline product.

Integration issues
That said, platform integration can be hugely complex, he told ADM.

Fitting a Bushmaster with some sort of Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM) system is tricky, for example, as the equipment itself and its wiring and antennas need to be integrated with the internal and external equipment and antennas the vehicle already carries in order to prevent electromagnetic interference and to ensure the vehicle has sufficient power and cooling capacity.

It requires a competent and willing OEM to carry out the necessary integration and testing to meet both operational and Occupational Health & Safety requirements, and there's little point in wasting time holding some sort of competitive tender to do this work when the OEM is already available to do it at short notice.

In such acquisitions speed is of the essence, so the quest is for adequacy rather then perfection.

Given sufficient time the capability in question could be selected more carefully, possibly purchased at a better price, and would have been integrated into the existing force more tidily.

RAPs, as Harnwell points out, don't concern themselves over much with the classic Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC).

However, some items of RAP equipment will enjoy a long service life and their proper integration will need to be considered at leisure once the urgency of the initial requirement has passed.

Does the RAP system work?

The evidence suggests that it does, according to Harnwell.

An important measure of user satisfaction is the Army's RODUM (Report on Defective or Unsuitable Materiel) system where users file complaints and suggestions through the Land Engineering Agency.

The system isn't flagging up signs of dissatisfaction with the equipment that is fielded under RAPs, he told ADM.

And formal and informal feedback from military and civilian VIPs who have visited units in theatre, and actually used some of the equipment (especially body armour and helmets), suggest that in the area of force protection, at least, Australian troops are being issued with equipment that is cutting edge and world-class.

The advantage of the RAP system, he says, is that the rapid response ensures that the equipment delivered to the troops is the latest version of whatever is available - much of this is already in service with coalition partners, and the Diggers can compare their own equipment directly with that used by their allies.

There is another procurement mechanism starting to come into use also, Harnwell told ADM.

The Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) is a recent innovation: while the level of urgency may be similar to an RAP, and the acquisition process is the same, the difference is the source of funds.

An RAP will typically be funded with extra cash from the Government; a UOR will not, so the DMO and the end user will need to fund the acquisition internally, by diverting funds from another application or by canceling or deferring other planned purchases.

The nearest thing to a disadvantage of the RAP system is probably the fact that it accretes a diversified inventory of equipment that isn't necessarily what the ADF would have ordered, if given more time to consider the FICs and select equipment and contractors accordingly.

But many RAP items will probably have a relatively short service life, and their enduring legacy (aside from the service render on the battlefield) may be the expertise they help generate within the ADF which in turn shapes the requirements definition and acquisition processes for DCP projects down the track.

Exporting the smart way

Australia is a member country of several international regimes controlling the international trade in defence and certain dual use goods.

The Department of Defence is responsible for administering controls on the export of these goods, and granting authorisations to export.

The Defence Export Control Office (DECO) performs this role.

If you export defence or dual use goods and technologies, DECO can assist you to determine whether your goods are controlled and if a permit or license is required.

The export of goods and technologies designed or adapted for use by armed forces, or that can be used in the production of defence related goods and services are subject to control under the Customs (Prohibited Export) Regulations.

All items subject to control are listed in the Defence and Strategic Goods List (DSGL).

Defence is also responsible for administering the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 which covers the export of goods, technologies and services that could be used in a WMD program which are not listed elsewhere under Customs regulations.

DECO considers the strategic, foreign policy and economic factors surrounding each application to export defence and dual-use goods as well as human-rights concerns.

Dual use goods
Dual Use goods are goods that are developed to meet commercial needs, but which may be used either as military components, or in the development or production of military systems or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Dual Use goods controlled for export are detailed in the Defence and Strategic Goods List, and include items such as Chemicals, Electronics, Computers, Telecommunications, Information Security, Sensors, Lasers and Navigation Equipment.

Some goods that are not listed may also be subject to an end-use control if the end use or end-user are linked to a WMD purpose.

Exporters are encouraged to seek Defence Export Control Office advice.

DECO undertakes an Outreach program that aims to educate exporters to enable them to meet their export control obligations.

It seeks to raise awareness of the methods employed by some states and terrorist groups to obtain controlled goods.

Free training on export controls and information packs for exporters are also available from DECO.