From The Source: Rear Admiral Peter Jones, DSC, AM, RAN Head of Capability Systems ,Department of Defence

The 2009 Defence White Paper heralded significant change and growth in the RAN’s undersea warfare capabilities. The recently appointed Head of Capability Systems, RADM Peter Jones, is at the heart of the planning process which will see the Navy acquire and field these new capabilities. He spoke to Editor at Large Gregor Ferguson.

ADM: The Future Frigates will be the RAN’s first ASW-driven surface combatant designs for a generation. What’s behind this?

Jones: The Defence White Paper envisages that the Future Frigate will be delivered under Project Sea 5000 and will be larger than the Anzac Frigate and will have “a strong emphasis on ASW”. The Frigates though will be the workhorses of the fleet and as such in addition to its planned ASW capabilities the Sea 5000 surface combatant will have to significantly contribute to air and surface warfare, both in blue water and in the littoral. The Sea 5000 Frigate has to be seen in that context.

Now the Defence White Paper highlighted the need for the ADF to have greater emphasis on its capacity to detect and respond to submarines in its primary operating environment but this will be achieved through a layered ASW capability, and you can see in the White Paper that this approach is highlighted not only by Sea 5000. In the nearer term you’ve got significant ASW capabilities with the Air Warfare Destroyer, capability improvements to the Collins-class submarines, also the ASW capability improvements for the Anzac frigate, and the planned introduction into service of the MH-60 Romeo Seahawk helicopters and the P-8 Poseidon Maritime Aircraft. So I think we’ve just got to see it as part of the system.

ADM: The new Romeo Seahawks are going to deliver very powerful ASW capabilities that the Fleet Air Arm hasn’t really enjoyed for years, and they’re going to transform the ships they’re embarked on. So what do you need to do to the Anzac frigates, either in a technical sense or through training and upskilling to make them better able to support and exploit that capability?

Jones: I agree with you that the Romeos are a very potent ASW machine. I think they demand expertise around the dipping sonar, and in the first instance we will look to our people who have done exchange service and also some of the more experienced aviators and also the Principal Warfare Officers who have done exchange service with the Royal Navy. All will have had exposure through their previous employment.
But in answer to your question, I think that the key bit from the dipping sonar side, is establishing a major standoff buffer between the enemy submarine and the surface force. Apart from modifications to the stowage space in the hangar and the helicopter securing and traversing system, the Anzac should be able to exploit that full suite of ASW capabilities of this aircraft through its existing communications and tactical data link systems.

But once again, the Seahawk’s going to operate as part of a broader ASW system, so it’s going to be cued by ASW ISR aspects; it’s going to be cued potentially through submarines and the towed arrays that will be on the AWD and in time the Anzac, and also via the P-8 Poseidon MPA. And I guess the other thing to appreciate is that the Seahawk will be an ISR asset in its right and in addition will be a potent surface warfare asset, particularly in the Littoral.

ADM: Do you feel that the ADF actually needs to recover lost ground in ASW and undersea warfare more generally? And What does it actually take to generate a robust ASW capability?

Jones: To answer that in two parts: first, in the Cold War period ASW was a major focus of the RAN and the RAAF Maritime Patrol Squadrons and in some aspects, for example with the Ikara system, the Mulloka sonar and Barra sonouoy, we were a world leader. We were also quite innovative in terms of tactics. Inevitably, however, the Navy and the MPA force had to focus on its current mission and its threat sets. So in recent years their focus has really been about maritime interception approaches and I think it’s fair to say that they’ve done outstandingly well in these complex operations.

But as can be seen from the White Paper and the DCP and some training in events such as the ASWEX Series that we have every year, there’s been a recognition that a comprehensive ASW capability is essential to the future and you actually have to devote significant resources to that. So answering the second part of your question – what does it take? – A better question might be, ‘where would the list end’? I think that if you look at the fundamental inputs to capability, the lens through which we look at all capabilities, there’s a large amount of work that needs to happen to develop a robust ASW capability, not only in terms of training but also tactics and doctrine, and practicing with weapons and actually having the full structure to be able to exploit capabilities.

I think ASW is an area where it takes many years to develop the expertise but I think fortunately for the ADF our submarine force is an important source of much of this expertise and it’s that submarine force that will help us with the invigoration of our own ASW capability.

ADM: What ASW/undersea warfare capabilities are the AWDs, upgraded Anzacs and Future Frigates likely to incorporate which the RAN doesn’t field at present?

Jones: The AWDs will be delivered with an integrated sonar suite, hosting both hullmounted and towed sensors – indicating the multi-purpose nature of these ships.
Although unapproved at the moment, it is intended that the Anzacs will also benefit from several unique Australian sonar developments under Sea 1408, with an emphasis on improving performance of the ship’s hull mounted sonar and providing for improved situational awareness via off-board sensors. Sea 1100 will also be investigating the installation of long range ASW sensors for the ANZAC force. Predicting what systems and weapons Sea 5000 will deliver is a much harder task, as the rate of technological change is such that certain emerging sensing techniques will inevitably shape and transform how ASW is conducted into the middle of the century. As identified within the White Paper, the next generation of surface combatants will employ an integrated sonar suite and the Navy’s Romeo Seahawk helicopters to provide for a comprehensive detection and engagement capability.

ADM: We’ve spoken almost exclusively so far about anti-submarine warfare but it’s less than a decade since the RAN’s mine hunting capabilities were deployed in the Gulf at the end of the second Iraq war. Is the mine threat still out there? Is it still as prominent and as present as it was a decade and more ago?

Jones: In littoral waters mines remain a potent sea denial weapon. That said, emergent underwater technologies are enabling mine counter-measure forces to identify and neutralise mines more efficiently than ever. This serves to reinforce the premise that for every attacking methodology, there is an equally effective countermeasure under development. Within the DCP there are three projects designed to provide the Navy with a means to counter the mine threat: Sea 1180, the Offshore Combatant Vessel (OCV), Sea 1778 [Deployable MCM for use by a deployed task group] and Sea 1350, which will deliver new acoustic and magnetic range capabilities.

Certainly the RAN, the Royal Navy and the US Navy learnt a considerable amount in the Gulf in 2003 about mine warfare and that resulted in changes to our tactics.
Also there was an appreciation of how you need a suite of ASW capabilities to counter the threat, particularly in a timely fashion. I think the other thing that we saw in Iraq was that it’s important to be able to blend a range of capabilities from different navies to be able to achieve the desired effect.

ADM: One of the things that’s changed since the mid 1990s, when the RAN started developing and building the Huon Class Mine Hunters, is the concept of taking MCM ships out of the minefield if we can. This is the thinking behind Project Sea 1778 which is going to fundamentally reshape the RAN’s MCM capabilities.
How far is that going to actually dominate the design of the OCVs which we’re planning to acquire under Sea 1180?

Jones: As a point of correction, Sea 1778 is not seeking to re-shape MCM, as the project is scoped to provide an expeditionary MCM capability in support of amphibious operations, so it’s a bit early to predict the last days of proven MCM methodologies just yet. However, as you have indicated Sea 1180 will draw considerable insight into how non-traditional MCM techniques such as UUVs will define how best to affect
the future MCM mission – without entering the mine field.

There’s a couple of bits to this issue. One is that we’re very much at a point of understanding what’s the art of the possible in terms of standoff capabilities, and so the trials and technology demonstration work that’s gone in to date with underwater remote vehicles has been important. That will inform us in terms of how that project moves forward. We believe that Sea 1778 as it evolves will be important in terms of where we go forward with the OCV, and you would think that one likely scenario is that the MCM capability that we would have in a deployed task group would also essentially be the same sort of capability that will be in a Sea 1180 OCV.

In respect to Sea 1180, we’re very much in the early stages. The challenge we have there is, how do you integrate a range of capabilities – a patrol and response capability, hydrography and mine countermeasures – in a common hull? We’re pretty confident that you can achieve that but there’s a lot of work to do to actually understand what the issues are, what some of the potential trade-offs are. But to be able to do some of these missions remote from the actual, in one case say the mine danger area is actually critical to be able to do it cost-effectively in one hull type.

ADM: The 2009 White Paper was surprisingly prescriptive about the size of the OCV. How much latitude have you actually allowed yourselves in scoping the capability, the size and the configuration?
Does anything in the White Paper rule out an aluminium multi-hull for example?

Jones: Our view is that the White Paper is not prescriptive. What in fact it says is that the OCV should have a displacement of up to 2,000 tonnes. That’s larger than the Armidale Class and gives quite a lot of scope. In respect to aluminium multi-hulls, it certainly allows those sort of vessels to be included in consideration and indeed we see those sort of vessels as very much being a potential design that you could base the Sea 1180 capability around.

ADM: The figure of 2,000 tonnes seems to imply some sort of threshold. Is that a size threshold or a capability threshold?

Jones: I think it’s more a size. If you’re looking at vessels operating in northern Australia, one of the constraints you will have is port facilities. If you look at a conventional mono-hull of 2,000 tonnes, there may be some ports where it cannot easily get alongside without us having to spend money on upgrading the port. That will be certainly one of the issues we have to look at. In the case of a multi-hull one of the size constraints will be the beam, and if you are wanting to operate that vessel out of existing ports like the wharf at HMAS Cairns and at the Darwin Naval Base, there are some size dimensions which may mean that you may be constrained, unless you want to spend money to upgrade those port facilities. So there’s a number of issues like that which we just need to understand. In short, what are the constraints and what are the potential cost drivers.