Force Protection: The fight against IEDs | ADM July 2012

According to Defence, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are responsible for more than half of the casualties suffered by coalition troops in Afghanistan.

What’s more, in 2011 alone, almost 700 IED strikes were recorded outside Iraq and Afghanistan. They occurred in 111 countries, caused in excess of 13,000 casualties and were linked to more than 40 insurgent or issue-motivated groups.

It’s easy to understand why the IED has become the weapon of choice for insurgents: confrontation with numerically and technologically superior forces is avoided, the technology to build and trigger the device is relatively simple and cheap, they are often difficult to detect and, thanks to the internet, there is an instant source of propaganda available.

Such is the concern that in July 2009, then Defence Minister John Faulkner launched a Force Protection Review to ensure that Australian troops deployed to Afghanistan were adequately protected. Counter IED (C-IED)measures were an important part of that review.

Since then, several C-IED measures have been put in place, others are in the pipeline and there is an ongoing project (JP154) to ensure that C-IED capability keeps pace with technology and tactics of insurgents around the globe.

Defence’s Rapid Prototyping, Development and Evaluation (RPDE) and Capability and Technology Demonstrator (CTD) programs are also making a significant contribution to the Australian Defence Force’s C-IED capability and, in addition to these measures; a further project will enhance Army’s route clearance systems. This latter measure, Project Ningaui, will spend a further $70 million on equipment for the deployed troops in Afghanistan.

Force protection review

The results of the Force Protection Review were made public in June 2010 after the report, conducted by then Chief of Joint Operations, Lieutenant General Mark Evans had been considered by the Chief of Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston.

The review heralded $1.1 billion of funding to ‘minimise the vulnerability of personnel, facilities and equipment’ in Afghanistan and another $485 million was added through supplementary funding to the overarching Operation Slipper. Altogether, $1.6 billion is being spent on the Force Protection Review, which made 48 recommendations for capability enhancements, including greater focus on C-IED operations.

A whole range of measures have or are being implemented, from greater use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to enhanced Electronic Countermeasures and Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance capabilities.

From a C-IED perspective, the review flagged an improved route clearance capability, enhanced countermeasures, additional working dogs and greater Explosives Hazards Awareness Training, which had first begun in January 2009.

“IEDs are responsible for a substantial number of coalition casualties in Afghanistan,” says Defence. “The threat is indiscriminate and not only kills and maims coalition and security forces, but also targets the local civil population. Insurgents constantly adapt their use of these measures, so the counter measures required need to constantly change.”

This ability by insurgents to adapt their tactics makes it particularly difficult to remain ahead of the game. Bomb-makers in Afghanistan have demonstrated their ability to move from simple IED devices to more complex examples and then back again, keeping coalition forces constantly on their toes.

“In response, Australia has set a path to acquiring an extensive C-IED capability,” says Defence. “This program envisages a range of C-IED capabilities, including an institutionalised continuum of training for ADF members; an array of integrated equipment solutions and an extensive counter network capability that focuses on threat motivated group activities before an IED event.”

C-IED task force

Before the Force Protection Review, the ADF had established a C-IED Task Force (CIED TF) to co-ordinate and monitor response to the threat. The establishment of the CIED TF was instigated in February 2006 and has links to similar organisations within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as well as the US Joint IED Defeat Organisation.

“The ADF’s approach to combating the IED threat is heavily reliant on robust and adaptable tactics, techniques and procedures, coupled with the provision of world standard technology,” said a Defence spokesperson. “Defence, in parallel with its ISAF partners, is constantly exploring technology-based opportunities to strengthen its counter IED capabilities. DSTO also performs a critical role in this area.”

While the CIED TF is not directly involved in operations in Afghanistan, it provides specific intelligence and analysis that informs operational activities. It also assists with equipment development and procurement, tactics, techniques and procedures development, international counter network strategies and weapons technical intelligence activities related to IEDs.

“The CIED TF is responsible for whole of Australian Government liaison and policy considerations and it also provides technical advice to Afghanistan counter-IED staff through the ADF’s operational command chain,” says Defence.

After each IED event or the discovery of weapons building facilities, parts and debris are brought back to Australia for analysis and, where possible, testing. Within the CIED TF, the Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT) is responsible for the analysis of the components recovered, allowing determination of the best methods of countering the threat.

“Measuring success is not a simple activity. The insurgent IED campaign in Afghanistan is complex and evolves in a ‘move-counter move’ scenario,” explained the spokesperson. “Success can be measured through defeating an evolved insurgent tactic, increasing the IED clearance and find rates and the mitigation of the IED blast effects on personnel and equipment.”

It is important to consider this latter point. Despite the advancement of intelligence, tactics and technology it is inevitable that IED strikes will not only continue, but will continue to be the weapon of choice for those fighting an insurgent war. Protecting personnel against the effects of blast is perhaps the most important factor.

Blast-proof goggles and improved helmets have gone some way to mitigating these effects, as have the acquisition of the Tiered Body Armour System (TBAS) and the Australian development of shaped body armour. Other measures, including the up-armouring of the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) and the recent Government decision to acquire more Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles also contribute significantly to the wellbeing of deployed troops.

Project Ningaui

In addition to the Force Protection Review, the Government has launched Project Ningaui, to provide further measures to protect troops from IEDs.

“Under Ningaui, Government provided an additional $70 million for new route clearance systems to detect and clear explosive hazards, creating a safer pathway for troops as they patrol Uruzgan Province in Afghanistan,” explains the Defence spokesperson. “Each system includes vehicles with ground penetrating radars to detect explosive hazards, engineering vehicles and mine rollers to provide a greater level of protection against explosive hazards.”

The route clearance system to be delivered under Ningaui will provide a safer method of working over the traditional, and battle-proven, dismounted manual search method. Known as the Australian Protected Route Clearance Capability (APRCC), Ningaui will provide a phased capability and will include both mounted and dismounted solutions. Whilst effective, the dismounted search exposes personnel to serious injury or death and a mechanised solution already in use by the US, the UK, Canada, France Germany and Italy have been proven to offer greater protection. The APRCC will leverage off this coalition experience and, in particular, will incorporate elements of the solutions developed by the US, UK and Canada.

The original timetable calls for the Ningaui system to be operational by the end of the year, but in the meantime two Canadian Expedient Route Operating Capability (EROC) systems had been acquired on loan. Ningaui will comprise of four complete stand-alone systems, each comprising of two Husky Mk.3 protected route clearance vehicles fitted with ground penetrating radar, one Husky Mk.3 with an interrogator arm, two High Mobility Engineer Excavators (HMEE) and two Bushmasters fitted with the Self Protection Adaptive Roller Kit (SPARK) Mine Roller Mk.2.

The Husky Mk.3, manufactured by Critical Solutions International in the US, is claimed to be the most blast-survivable vehicle in Afghanistan today. It is designed to separate into components when struck by an IED and is therefore relatively easily repaired. Army says that some US Army Huskies have been blown up on more than one occasion and are still in service today.

The Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology (NIITEK) ground penetrating radar is capable of detecting objects, both metallic and non-metallic, hidden beneath a road surface. Army claims that a competent operator can demonstrate a higher probability of IED detection and a lower false alarm rate than the traditional unmounted, hand-held detector.

The Husky variant with the interrogator arm can uncover and dig up a detected IED at a distance of six metres from the vehicle, whilst the crew remain safely within. The interrogator arm has a camera attached and can be used to look over walls or other obscured areas and therefore allow an object to be investigated without the crew having to dismount.

The JCB High Mobility Engineer Excavator is integrated into the Ningaui system to either repair roads damaged by an IED, or to create a bypass route around the device. They are fitted with bar armour, spall liner, blast-attenuating seat, belly plate and ‘situational awareness’ systems. Six HMEE systems have been delivered to the Australian Army and are based at Tarin Kot.

The SPARK Mine Roller Mk.2 (SMR2) kits acquired will be fitted to two Bushmasters in each of the four Ningaui systems, to detonate an IED that may have failed to have been detected by the other methods. The system is designed to be mounted on tactical wheeled vehicles and can be released remotely from within the Bushmaster if required. The Bushmaster vehicle itself is modified with energy absorbing seats and strengthened welding to add a greater level of protection and reduce the probability of lower limb damage during an IED detonation.

RPDE, CTD, Project JP154 and the future

Army is the Capability Manager for the C-IED strategies and is currently working through a program to ‘institutionalise’ these capabilities within the ADF. This will come via a program of reform, training, organisational structure evolution and the continuing support of C-IED development. The RPDE and CTD programs have already contributed significantly to the battle against IEDs, and continue to do so.

“RPDE has undertaken a number of tasks for the ADF CIED TF,” said a Defence spokesperson. “These tasks have been useful in determining current levels of technology, informing procurement decisions, providing interface with industry and delivering developed systems into ADF operational use.”

One example of technology developed under the CTD program is the work done by The Centre for Intelligent Systems Research at Deakin University, which has developed a haptic technology robot arm, which can be fitted to any existing robotic platform. Haptic technology allows an operator to manipulate and ‘feel’ both virtual and remote objects, picking it up and feeling its centre of mass, density and consistency.

“The CTD program has allowed Defence to have the haptic robot arm developed to a point where it is being considered for operational service,” says Defence. “If successful in the integration with Defence equipment this capability could enter service with military and security services globally.”

Though it says that other technologies are often classified, Defence says that developments such as forward-looking ground penetrating radar, improved imaging capabilities, enhanced vehicle protection concepts and remote sensing and explosive detection capabilities are ‘enduring’.

Project JP154 (Joint Counter Improvised Explosive Device Capability) aims to oversee future developments in sympathy with strategic priorities, while at the same time remaining flexible enough to take advantage of rapidly changing technology and respond to an unpredictable threat. The two current components, Phases 2 and 3 will ensure that C-IED capability keeps pace with technology and evolving threat into the next decade.

Phase Two will support a refresh of existing systems, but will also introduce new C-IED capabilities and enhance current ADF Weapons Technical Intelligence Capability. Initial Operating Capability for this phase is, according to the 2011 Defence Capability Plan at least, due to occur in the 2014-2016 timeframe, but will be defined later in the project development process.

Phase Three will continue the technological refresh of the Force Protection Electronic Counter Measure (FPECM) and C-IED systems and examine the possibility of expanding their use to other ADF platforms. It also plans to replace existing Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) robots and develop the route clearance capability being delivered under Project Ningaui even further.

Because of the very fluid nature of the IED situation, these two phases are very much a moving feast, making any definitive description difficult. IOC for Phase Three for example, is identified in the DCP as occurring sometime between 2018 and 2021, yet will have a Life of Type of only five years.

“JP154 will consider the counter-IED needs of the Defence and deliver required capabilities in an appropriate time frame. This program and funding line ensures that Defence and Army can meet the emerging global IED threat,” explains Defence.

During the transition of control in Afghanistan over the next couple of years however, not much will change.

“The IED remains the insurgent weapon of choice. This will not change through transition and the ADF CIED TF will continue to develop advanced counter-IED capabilities. This last point is important to the future as a global proliferation in the use of IEDs remains on the increase,” concludes the spokesperson. “The ADF will remain responsive to this emerging global threat.”