EW: Training ADF personnel for Shadow operations | ADM May 2012

Has US Army training of ADF personnel on the Shadow 200 inhibited the development of Australian techniques and procedures for tactical UAV operations?

Back in 2005, activities associated with the raising and implementation of the 20 STA (Surveillance and Target Acquisition) Regiment were nearing completion in anticipation of the procurement and introduction into service of a Tactical UAV system under JP 129. These included a decision for key members of the proposed UAV troop to undertake 12 months training in the UK. On return they would develop the doctrine and TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) for the UAV system and conduct training for the UAV battery.


At the time, Major Phil Hamsey who was implementation manager for 20 STA Regt, writing in the Army newspaper, said the UK and US had more than 50 years of combined experience with UAVs and the Australian Army would learn from that experience.

“Part of the reason we’re sending soldiers to the UK is so we don’t need to make 50 years’ worth of mistakes to reach a high operational standard,” he said, adding that UAV troop training would be conducted at Gallipoli Barracks.

Now, half a decade later, 20 STA Regiment’s implementation manager, Major Kieran Joyce, is similarly involved in the oversight of training for ADF personnel on JP129’s TUAV—the RQ-7B Shadow 200. Of the two Shadow 200 systems ordered, each comprising five aircraft, together with ground control stations, ground data terminals, launchers and tactical automatic landing system, one system has been delivered and is now close to being operational in Afghanistan. The other is due to be delivered by mid-year and will be used at Enoggera to train personnel prior to deployment to ADF TUAS operations at Tarin Kot.

Last year Major Joyce reported that personnel from 20 STA Regt had been taking part in three different courses with their US counterparts at Fort Huachuca in Arizona. Warrant officers, lieutenants and captains undertook six-week platoon leader courses and other ranks a 17-week operator course which covered aerodynamics theory at ground flight school, setup and takedown of the system, simulator flying and actual flying on practise missions. For maintenance staff, there was a 14-week technician maintainer course.

MAJ Joyce said some of those participating in the training were qualified ScanEagle instructors and would stay on to complete an additional four-week Shadow 200 instructor course. He said that over the next 18 months, 100 personnel will have rotated through the US training programs. By the end of 2012, Army aims to be running its own training courses with the non-flying component occurring at the School of Artillery at Puckapunyal and at 20 STA Regiment at Enoggera. The former, no doubt, providing specialist FO/TAC training for artillery spotting/targeting.

Shadow training aids

AAI, the original equipment manufacturer and system integrator for the Shadow 200 UAS, developed its own training capabilities and the company says the Shadow Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) high-fidelity suite is designed to provide time- and cost efficient individual, crew, and collective training. It supports skill development for Shadow air vehicle and mission payload operators, launch and recovery personnel, and mission commanders.

The training of ADF personnel in the US would likely have included the use of AAI training aids in the UAS schoolhouse at Fort Huachuca. However Defence says the training aids acquired as part of the FMS purchase were not based on AAI ’s TADSS and that a full task simulation capability has been acquired through FMS that heavily utilises PC-based scenario and fault generation.

So will the training that 20 STA personnel have received on a US TUAS designed for US military needs, influence Australian concepts of employment? We did ask Defence whether an unclassified concept of employment of the Shadow 200 was available and since the answer was in the negative, we thought we might look at the capabilities the ADF is receiving from the RQ-7B Shadow, how the US Army employs their similarly equipped TUAS, and how relevant this may be to ADF CONEM.

Shadow 200 capabilities 

The RQ-7B Shadow 200 is a lightweight, tactical UAV system, comprising air vehicles, modular mission payloads, ground control stations, launch and recovery equipment, and communications equipment.

In US Army service a system will carry enough supplies and spares for an initial 72 hours of operation transportable in two HMMWVs with shelters, and two additional HMMWVs with trailers as troop carriers. For ADF use the systems currently deployed to Afghanistan are containerised and static but the systems can be deployed on existing and future Land 121 vehicles.

So how are they controlled? Ground Control Stations for UAVs have two main functions. One is to control the UAV’s flight and payloads while the other involves communication back to the larger command network, and the ability to send the UAV’s data to other nodes in the network.

ADM assumes that the ground control systems acquired are based on the One System GCS able to control the flight of various UAS types and receive their telemetry. Each GCS is equipped with ruggedised Intel PCs running Microsoft Windows using game-level graphics cards as embedded hardware for the training system.

Building on the One System GCS, AAI has developed the Universal GCS featuring net-centric design, digital Tactical Common Data Link for data transmission, increased bandwidth and data security, and weapons control. The UGCS has now been successfully integrated into the Shadow system.

Defence tells us the Shadow 200 UAS acquired for Australian service permanently carries electro-optic (EO) and infra-red (IR) cameras, laser pointer (LP) for target marking, laser rangefinder (LRF) for target geo-location, laser target designator (LTD) for use with laser-guided munition (LGM) engagement, in-flight programmable Harris PRC-152 VHF secure communications relay payload (CRP), and Mode 4 IFF transponder.

The air vehicle is intended to provide coverage of a brigade area of interest for up to four hours, at 50 kilometres from the launch and recovery site. The maximum range is 125 kilometres (limited by data link capability), and operations are generally conducted from 8,000 to 10,000 feet AGL during the day and 6,000 to 8,000 feet AGL at night. The air vehicle uses a pneumatic launcher and is recovered by a tactical automatic landing system without pilot intervention on the runway.

UAS employment

For US Army operations the TUAV system must provide 12 hours of continuous operations within a 24-hour period. It must be able to surge to 18 hours within a 24-hour period, for up to three consecutive days. The system must be able to keep pace with a brigade’s movement, with rapid emplacement/displacement times. An air vehicle may be passed between control stations or launch and recovery stations to facilitate these requirements.

According to the US Army’s Pocket Guide to the Employment of Group 3/4/5 UAS, including the RQ-7B Shadow, UAS support of tactical operations falls into two major categories: ISR and Tactical Air Support. It says specific employment of UAS capabilities and platforms are a function of enemy, terrain, weather, troop location, support, time availability, and civil considerations.

ISR Missions – According to the guide ISR is an activity that synchronises and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets and processing, exploitation, dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. It says UAS ISR missions are broadly considered tactical air reconnaissance or surveillance.

Reconnaissance – Reconnaissance missions obtain combat information about enemy and indigenous population activities and resources through sensor payloads.

Route Reconnaissance – Is the directed effort to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route. UAS, with multi-sensor capabilities, are well-suited to reconnoitre the front, flanks and rear, providing early warning, ambush detection, and over watch.

Additional UAS support roles are: ground element over watch, trafficability assessment, landing site and hazard location, threat and suspicious item identification. The best results occur when synchronised and commanded by ground elements.

 

UAS Communications

The guide says communications are one of the most important aspects of the tactical employment of UAS with communications providing both capabilities and limitations to the UAS user, whether to control the UA, or to manage sensors and information flow. Users must be aware of enemy actions and environmental factors that can limit the effectiveness of UAS communications.

For example, LOS ranges advertised for various UAS may not take into account LOS restrictions, environmental attenuation, or frequency congestion. Although UAS communication is near-real time, there are several factors that can induce substantial time errors between users and operators. For instance, every relay station that a signal passes through can cause up to a 1/2 second delay in reception which across multiple nodes may result in a several-seconds delay between the actual UA sensor action and what the end user might see.

Frequency requirements for the RQ-7B Shadow TUAS include:

• S-Band LOS for the UA control DL-P

• One System Remote Video Terminal (OSVRT) for RVT

• Mode IIIC TADL/TCDL

• C-Band analog 4.4-5.85 Ghz for video.

Many UAS display UA and sensor information on the RVT. This information can be helpful in confirming sensor target location, determining TLE confidence, or developing tactics in regard to noise and visual signature of the UA.

 

ADF CONEM

The ADF had to develop it own operational concepts for ScanEagle which differ from those of other military users, with missions profiles varying from covert to overt depending on the target and demand. Covert persistent surveillance is an obvious role in Afghanistan.

Australian force protection measures are designed to minimise casualties in a combat area. Concerned about the safety of ADF personnel from IED attack and similar threats in counter insurgency operations, Defence has been employing persistent surveillance at FOBs and elsewhere, to establish and record ‘patterns of life’ from surveilled areas.

It can be assumed that such missions, where carried out by UAS, are not platform specific and that the ADF’s operational concepts developed with ScanEagle will certainly influence the utilisation of its replacement system in this regard. Indeed it has been reported that testing of the new Shadow 200 systems in Afghanistan has included IED surveillance duties.

However there will be some hurdles. ScanEagle has a significant advantage over the Shadow in terms of endurance, an important aspect of covert persistent surveillance – with up to 20 hours sortie endurance compared with 8-9 hours for the Shadow system. This may be one reason (another is attrition) why the ADF is acquiring almost twice the normal complement of air vehicles for a Shadow system.

 

End note

Further to our introductory query we would assume that the operation of ADF Shadow UAS in Afghanistan would involve close cooperation with their US military counterparts, including use of similar tactical UAS techniques and procedures. However the ADF would surely develop its own TTPs for future independent operations.