Editorials: Force Protection and timing | ADM Mar 2011
Katerine Ziesing | Canberra
In June of 2009, then defence minister Senator John Faulkner looked into the Force Protection measures that the ADF was operating with in Afghanistan. In June of 2010, he announced $1.6 billion worth of measures in response to this undertaking, with the issue addressed under 48 recommendations.
While the vast majority of this funding was to come from existing programs being sped up (the better part of $1.1 billion), they clearly set the agenda for Army procurement over the past year, with numerous capabilities being delivered, some even ahead of schedule and under budget.
Minister for defence Stephen Smith and defence materiel minister Jason Clare announced last month that 40 of the 48 recommendations have either been completed or are on track. Of the eight remaining, six are subject to monitoring and oversight and two projects will not proceed.
But all in all, Defence has moved quickly to address the concerns and capabilities outlined by minister Faulkner and should be congratulated for moving so quickly in response to the requirements. Though it took a ministerial intervention to get such rapidity into the acquisition process, the process has delivered for troops in Afghanistan.
Oddly enough, despite how comprehensive the Force Protection measures are and the differences they have made to operations on the ground, there is still a project that would provide an excellent source of support in Afghanistan that is languishing in the system: Land 40. As ADM Editor-at-Large Gregor Ferguson points out this month, there are two off the shelf contenders (OTS) for the 40mm Light Weight Automatic Grenade Launcher, along with a Fire Control System and ammunition who are by all accounts, literally twiddling their thumbs waiting to see what the DMO wants to do.
Tenders closed in October 2007; live firing trials were held in early 2008 and a source selection was due in June 2009, to be followed by an initial contract for 60 weapons with an option for a further 90 and deliveries commencing in 2010. So what’s the delay?
The DMO will not be drawn on the issue as negotiations are ongoing and are commercial in confidence. I must admit that I am beginning to lack confidence, commercial or otherwise, that a decision between two worthy and truly OTS solutions will be made in a timely fashion.
All at sea... or not
Gregor Ferguson | Sydney
How is it possible for the RAN to lose almost an entire operational capability in one fell swoop? This is exactly what has happened to the RAN whose three amphibious ships, HMAS Manoora, Kanimbla and Tobruk, were unavailable to respond to possible requests for assistance following a spate of natural disasters earlier this year.
Manoora is about to be decommissioned and Kanimbla won’t be operational for at least 12 months and it was uncertain at the time of writing when Tobruk would be available for tasking following unexpected maintenance problems. The damage caused by this unexpected operational shortfall is widespread: the ADF can’t use these ships to develop and practice its amphibious warfare capabilities; the Army and Navy will be unable to train and qualify helicopter pilots and observers for maritime operations; and the ship-board certification and qualification program for Army and Navy MRH90 helicopters will face serious delays.
This is a serious embarrassment for the RAN and the ADF. It has two causes; first, the service hasn’t invested sufficiently in sustaining its equipment; secondly, it is dealing with ageing platform issues – Tobruk is close to exceeding her Life of Type, while Manoora and Kanimbla were already past theirs when the RAN acquired them. At about $250 million for two ships (including extensive upgrades in Australia) they may have looked like good value for money at the time and have delivered good service. But they were never a robust capability – simply a quick(-ish) and cheap one, and the Navy is now paying a higher price.
What now? The Strategic Reform Program demands cash savings, but safety and seaworthiness demand continuing investment and you can’t deliver these things on the cheap. It’s possible to reconcile these aims but this requires Navy and the DMO fundamentally to rethink their approach and to engage industry from the bottom up.
The only good thing about the situation is that the Seaworthiness Board set up by the current Chief of Navy is doing its job and tackling safety and seaworthiness problems before they become into tragedies. Vice Admiral Crane deserves praise for this, as he did for tackling the running sore of submarine crewing and readiness. He will leave the Navy in better shape than he found it, but may not receive the thanks he deserves for his courageous decisions.