Editorial: Then and now | ADM Jul 2010
Katherine Ziesing | Canberra
In 2000, the world had yet to see the September 11 attacks or the Bali and London bombings.
The 2000 White Paper was framed in an entirely different security context to that of its 2009 successor.
But the capability plans laid in the 2000 document are much more relevant to the ADF’s current force in being.
Key projects outlined such as FFG upgrade, HF MOD, Vigilare, MRTT are all in the final stages of being delivered if not already in their final stages of acceptance.
Those foreshadowed such as ASMD, new fighters (JSF) and air defence capable ships (AWDs) are in the works.
But how will the new capabilities outlined in the 2009 White Paper look 10 years after its release?
Will the OcVs be on the go?
Are 12 submarines realistic?
Will the competition for light tactical airlift result in a decision this time round?
Will Overlander have delivered any trucks?
At least the 2009 White Paper covers itself with the subtitle Force 2030 as that’s when all the platforms outlined will hopefully be in service by.
There will be at least another White Paper and Force Structure Review in the coming decade, thanks to the five-yearly schedule announced last year.
It remains to be seen what effects they will have on the vision outlined in Force 2030.
The long anticipated Defence Industry Policy Statement and ASPI report into defence industry planning information along with the government’s response also made an appearance as ADM went to press.
In the Defence Capability Plan, ACAT levels will be expanded, time brackets will become years as projects approach second pass and projects that involve Priority Industry Capabilities will be clearly identified as companies will be asked how they address these elements in their Australian Industry Capability plans (which will now be audited).
Also of interest, was the announcement that the minors projects will appear online as part of a ‘one stop shop’ for Defence planning documents.
These documents are required reading for industry and are all available online.
While I welcome the raft of changes announced under these documents, they will only be useful if they are implemented.
I wish Defence nothing but the best of luck as the organisation has a lot to implement at the moment between the recommendations put forward under Mortimer and the Strategic Reform Program already underway.
Defence industry policy – a new start
Gregor Ferguson | Sydney
The 2010 Defence Industry Policy Statement echoes many of the aspirations of its predecessors.
The Statement reflects the sheer complexity of defence capability planning and delivery.
This complexity has defeated many previous attempts to improve acquisition performance and has resulted in a gradual marginalisation of Australia’s defence industry.
In recent times, Defence has sought to mitigate project risk and restore faith in its ability to spend taxpayers money wisely by adopting a project management approach which explicitly favours low-risk Military Off The Shelf (MOTS) purchases.
This approach also relies heavily on competitive pressure as its mechanism for achieving value for money, not always to the benefit of either customer or contractors.
However, last year’s report by The Helmsman Institute which benchmarked defence projects against non-defence projects showed vividly how difficult the DMO’s job is.
To give credit where it’s due, and notwithstanding some spectacular failures, the Helmsman report shows the DMO’s record of project delivery on time and on budget bears comparison with, and is often superior to, that of the most respected project management organisations around the world.
Rightly or wrongly, the DMO is generally held responsible for the cost and schedule performance of defence acquisition projects, but cause and effect are far more complex: capability development, acquisition and sustainment need to be treated as a holistic construct.
Industry needs to accept its fair share of responsibility, as must the Capability Development Group and the ADF.
The DMO has re-invented itself to meet the defence materiel challenge; if the new Defence Industry Policy Statement is to deliver, CDG and the ADF must also step up and ensure that the measure of efficient project delivery isn’t solely a function of the DMO’s acquisition processes.
If this happens, who can blame the DMO for defaulting to a risk-averse approach which could undermine the intent of this defence industry policy?
For the sake of this Defence Industry Policy Statement we have to hope that Prime Minister Gillard’s new cabinet, and its successors after the forthcoming Federal election, includes a Minister for Defence Materiel whose oversight ensures that all parties deliver on their responsibilities, and that the new Statement is given the chance to deliver what it promises.