Editorial: Steady or stagnant? | ADM November 2012

At what point does indecision become a decision in itself? This question can be asked of both of our themes this month; Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and the Future Submarine. The 2009 NCW Roadmap had some fantastic goals it wanted to achieve. The 2009 NCW Roadmap updates the 2007 roadmap. It outlines the requirements, future directions and actions to be taken to transition the ADF to a networked force, with particular emphasis on four key actions:

• setting NCW milestones to establish structured goals and time frames for NCW-related initiatives, which will progressively build to achieve the networked force;

• establishing an integrated network to link sensor, command and control, and engagement systems across the ADF, to integrate and exchange information between those systems, and to provide the underlying information and communications infrastructure that the networked ADF will be built-on;

• developing the human dimension of NCW to prepare the ADF and its people for operating in an increasingly networked battlespace, through changes in doctrine, organisation, training and education, with an emphasis on ‘learning by doing’; and

• accelerating the process of change and innovation to take advantage of advances in knowledge, processes and technology, refining these aspects through increased experimentation.

‘The ADF also needs to develop and deploy fully integrated services that are interoperable with other government agencies, allies and coalition partners. Some legacy systems in the ADF will also need to function in that integrated environment until replaced. Critically, for the best effect and cost, a networked ADF must be based on capabilities that are designed to be interoperable from inception, not as an afterthought in the development process.’

The lack of reporting on how this has progressed is disappointing as is the lack of updating of the roadmap itself. The roadmap framework that CDG implemented seems to have fallen by the wayside, not just for NCW. Perhaps the lack of funding behind such things has more to do with it. NCW is a joint issue, across platforms and capabilities that have no specific funding requirements for NCW concerns. Currently, projects do not contain an explicit budget for interoperability.

For the Future Submarine, much has already been said about the timing of the program and how it is coming together in its nascent stages. As this edition of ADM was coming together, details for the Integrated Project Team (IPT) were released on Austender. This approach aims to combine a best of breed solution of the skills that industry and government have to offer on such a complex program by ‘developing highlevel concept designs for a bespoke submarine to meet the 2009 White Paper capability.’

The IPT will help better inform Australian industry about the requirements of the project, foster growth of local submarine design capability, and determine the capability of progressing with an Australian bespoke design for Sea 1000 Government First Pass consideration. The IPT will develop two costed, scheduled and technically balanced submarine concept designs for this future submarine capability.

Subject to internal approval, the Commonwealth intends to run a formal Invitation to Participate process to establish a IPT Panel (with a range of suitable companies to provide secondees in a range of disciplines and roles into the IPT. Defence is seeking comment from industry on the exposure draft contractual documentation prior to the issue of a formal ITP to the open market, currently anticipated to occur this month and the team to initially run through until mid-2014.

The main theme for our articles on Future Submarine this month is the meeting point between timing and technology for this incredibly complex program. As mentioned in this month’s ADM looking at the UK Astute program for comparison, it takes about 9.5 years to build that particular submarine. Add that on top of world’s best practice which sees about a million man-hours go into designing such a platform. The timeline for the Collins retiring and the Future Submarine hitting the water means that Sea 1000 work needs to move forward sooner rather than later.

I have spoken before about the need for champions at the highest level to support such nation changing programs. The Future Submarine has no such champion at this time. The long timeline alone makes it difficult for a senior person to pin their career (military, political or otherwise) on supporting such a program with the ferocity it needs to make its way through the acquisition framework. The complexity of the program from a technology point of view is challenging in every sense of the word. The other challenges that are largely unspoken are negotiating the agendas of politics, industry and international partners. The IPT goes at least some way towards addressing these concerns and getting the rigour into the important work being done to shape Sea 1000.

As time continues to march on, some options will become less of a possibility while others may become more so, particularly on the technology front. Masterful inaction has its place but I sense that neither NCW or the Future Submarine will benefit greatly from the approach.