Editorial: Selectors' dilemma | ADM July 2011

A Defence-led cricket selection process (according to the cynics) would see players compete for selection, but the selection process would take two years be subject to unexpected and unexplained delays, regardless of the fixture schedule. Selection would need to be recompeted every season, regardless of player performance, and the player negotiating the lowest rate of pay would always win a place in the side. The skipper and coach would be rotated compulsorily every two years, to be replaced by people who have never played the game before.

There would be no bar against foreigners competing to play in the national team - indeed, there would be a preference for foreigners. Sheffield Shield fixtures would be cut back or cancelled altogether because there are insufficient spectators to make these matches commercially viable so local players, lacking match practice, would be unable to develop vital skills and character, would lack opportunities to maintain these and would lack a stage on which to demonstrate their capabilities.

Furthermore, the selectors themselves would no longer have opportunities to exercise and refine their own judgement by observing and comparing players. This means that foreign players would be even more likely to win selection because the selectors are unable to assess the performance and potential of local cricketers and can only go on the proven track records of foreign players. Of course, these foreigners didn’t create their track records by playing cricket.

Finally, to ensure a level playing field, the team would be selected only from players of similar skills and experience so we’d end up selecting a team of wicket-keepers. Then when the team started losing, match payments would be withheld until the team started winning again.

This view isn’t intended to be taken seriously. But it illustrates the attitude of many in industry to Defence and the DMO, conditioned by fears of an impending downturn in defence business.

However, it doesn’t acknowledge the underlying structural problems blighting defence acquisition, nor the constraints on the DMO, nor the changes that have taken place within the organisation over recent years, nor the fact that the DMO deals (largely successfully) with the most complex projects in Australia.

But it does reflect Defence’s unsophisticated understanding of its relationship with industry. As noted in The Australian a few weeks ago, Defence’s approach to industry is shaped by three assumptions: first, that industry is a homogenous entity whose skills and capacity it can tap at will; second, that competition will always drive down costs and deliver value for money; and, third, that market forces alone will ensure industry throws up credible contenders with the necessary skills and capacity.

However, defence work, by its nature, demands high levels of technical and management skill, experience and specialist domain knowledge. In a small, high-tech defence market like Australia’s, industry needs a regular flow of work to sustain and grow both individual and corporate skills.

Defence’s project-based acquisition process is designed to maximise competitive tension. But as our ‘From the Source’ interview subject, John Blackburn, points out, it’s unsuited to much of the complex, developmental acquisition work our operational environment demands. And it helps create risks by making it difficult or impossible to fund companies to do useful and important work between projects. Every peak in the acquisition cycle sees a surge in staff training and capital investment, but this doesn’t make up for the earlier loss of experience and deep, specialised domain knowledge.

Technical difficulties are inevitable in complex, high-tech projects, and Defence’s projects are the most complex in Australia. Their implications are more profound if the customer and contractor are both inexperienced at the work at hand.

All too often the DMO approaches complex, risky projects as if it’s buying commodities off the shelf. It signs complex fixed-price contracts which specify capability and performance in far too much detail, far too early in the development process and with a far too inflexible schedule. Such contracts don’t protect the ADF from delays and technical problems. They’re the product of a disinterested, ‘hands-off’ philosophy which values competition above all else, and won’t take a strategic approach to industry.

If Defence really believes local industry is strategically important, then its skills and capacity must be managed and nurtured with as much care as the combat capability of the ADF.

Australia can’t afford to pay a premium for locally-made equipment, but nor can it afford the inefficiencies the current acquisition system imposes on the defence industry. A more strategic approach would support an essential capability and help prevent future cost and schedule problems – just ask the cricket selectors.

Subject: ADM Editorials