Editorial: Any good news for Navy? | ADM Apr 2011

Katherine Ziesing | Canberra

It seems that Navy just can’t catch a break at the moment. The last few months have exposed a number of damaging issues that have come to light, through the release of various reports and some pointed questions in Senate Estimates. Despite plans in place to modernise their workforce culture and address various skills shortages through the New Generation Navy program, the HMAS Success report was scathing in its conclusions about the predatory culture among some of the ship’s company.

And shadow defence minister Senator David Johnston made life uncomfortable for the senior ranks in the Navy, Defence and DMO when it comes to the dollars surrounding the Collins class submarine sustainment effort.

“$325 million for sustainment and direct operating costs of $363 million, is what you have quoted me,” Senator Johnston said to DMO CEO Dr Gumley at the February hearing. “We know that unit ready days are going down. We have had over that period 2009-10 two of the six submarines at sea. If you look at all of the maintenance periods when those submarines have been out of the water, we have had potentially two submarines at any given moment that can swim. Do you believe that those numbers - 700 unit ready days at $688 million for two submarines - are value for money for the taxpayer?”

Further questioning about benchmarking these sustainment costs against international efforts came up, but there didn’t seem to be anyone who could answer the Senator, with more questions going on notice than being answered.

Add to that the issues surrounding the Navy’s inability to support amphibious operations with HMA Ships Manoora and Kanimbla out of action and Tobruk apparently needing 48 hours notice to embark on operations if needed, and Navy seems to be having trouble pointing to something to be proud of.

Yet in each of these cases, there is no single point of failure, be it a person or decision, which we can point to and say, “Here’s where it all went wrong. Let’s not do that again.” This is also the same organisation that is looking to replace most of its current fleet in the coming decades, both above and below the water.

Buried beneath boards, committees and process the accountability has been lost. I do hope that it can be found again in time for Navy to once again be proud of its ability to deliver a positive outcome to government and the taxpayer.

Process v Outcome: an either-or proposition?

Gregor Ferguson | Sydney

According to a senior Defence speaker at this year’s AUVS-International UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) conference in Melbourne, the ADF has logged 30,000 operational flying hours with its Raven, Skylark, ScanEagle, Aerosonde and Heron UAVs. Yet none of the projects which delivered these systems were ever part of the Defence Capability Plan (DCP). All of these UAVs were acquired off the shelf at short notice (some were even borrowed), as ‘interim’ solutions.

Similarly, several projects which the DMO has held up as examples of good project delivery never featured in the DCP, either: the C-17, Super Hornet and M1A1 Abrams tank. These were all short-notice, sole-source acquisitions whose value to the ADF, once delivered, has never been questioned. Meanwhile, projects which have earned themselves a time-honoured place in the DCP, such as Land 121 Ph 3, Land 40 Ph 2, JP129 Ph 2 and Land 17 Ph 1C move at a glacial pace.

Only one of these has made it into contract, and even that had to be terminated after further delay and the equipment acquired under a sole-source agreement. Presumably these delays don’t matter. Or perhaps the ADF doesn’t start to feel the discomfort of capabilities delayed until a contract is signed and industry can then be blamed for late delivery?

If delays do matter, if schedule truly is what keeps the DMO’s senior leaders awake at night, how can Defence afford such slow, tortuous and often flawed processes leading up to (or not, as the case may be) source selection and contract award? In fairness, the DMO receives much blame which should really be directed elsewhere, and operates defensively as a result. It tries to deliver the maximum value for money with the least exposure to all types of risk.

The DMO’s processes exist partly to protect Defence from technical and schedule risk and from predatory behaviour by industry. But it’s not at all clear from the way it behaves and the processes it tries to impose that the DMO understands how industry works and what motivates and drives their behaviour, and therefore how to get the best out of what is by necessity a mutually dependent relationship.

It seems all too often the DMO’s risk-averse processes get in the way of achieving outcomes - even when it is trying to buy a MOTS product such. How hard can it be?