Defence Business: Is MOTS possible for the Future Submarine program? | ADM Feb 2010

These will initiate the concept development phase to conduct the design/capability trade offs and develop costed options and will set the course for the project.

Let's examine the core questions to be answered.

Peter Briggs | Canberra

By 2030, our region will be dominated by the growing political, economic and strategic power of China and India, constraining Australia's choices.

Australia is an island: the maritime environment will be increasingly important to economic well-being.

Significant growth in regional Navies will make it more difficult for our Navy to operate freely in the region.

There is also a growth of modern European and Russian designed submarines being deployed in our region.

China and India are also developing nuclear powered and armed submarines.

This developing situation will constrain Australia's strategic options.

A capable Australian submarines force will be able to operate in these difficult strategic circumstances, providing a ‘strategic sting' that will make a potential aggressor avoid a military confrontation with Australia.

There are two critical parts to this strategy.

Firstly, as for all forms of deterrence, the perception of the capability in the eyes of the adversary is critical.

Secondly, if put to the test the sting must be able to deliver the promised outcome - unbearable pain.

Why submarines?
Submarines are the ultimate stealth platform, able to operate without fuss in areas where sea and air control is not assured and to gain access to areas denied to others.

Large submarines, such as Collins, are able to operate at long range for weeks.

They can carry a flexible payload of sensors, weapons and specialist personnel.

A capable Australian submarine force creates great uncertainty: countering them is difficult, expensive and cannot be guaranteed.

More than just a good insurance policy, submarines are unique in many ways, able to:
• Simultaneously observe activities under water, on the surface, in the air and over the electromagnetic spectrum in areas denied to other eyes and ears including satellites.
• Deliver the most potent antisubmarine capability.
• Covertly position precision land attack missiles, retire if not required, or launch and withdraw undetected.
• Protect surface naval operations.
• Covertly launch and recover special forces.
• Lay sophisticated, precision mines to deny access to selected facilities and areas.

In situations short of conflict, submarines are able to provide unique indications of another's long term intentions, facilitating counter measures via diplomacy and force preparation that will hopefully avoid an escalation to conflict.

To be able to exploit the initiative gained from their stealth, Australia's submarines must be able to covertly reach sensitive areas throughout our region with sufficient mobility (Mobility here is defined as ‘the capacity to complete the long snort transits required expeditiously and discretely'), range, payload and adequate habitability for the long duration missions involved, frequently in hot tropical waters.

They should avoid the necessity of using forward bases to do so; access to such bases cannot be guaranteed under all circumstances and the reduction in operational security adds to the hazards faced by our submarines.

A submarine's stealth and access confers significant initiative, they should be employed proactively to exploit this.

Where appropriate, they are best employed offensively to maximise the benefits gained from this advantage.

Arguments that Australia's submarines should be used defensively and constrained to defending the sea approaches to Australia would deny Australia the initiative, priceless information and ability to influence the development of a situation that can be gained by imaginative use of a capable submarine force in situations across the whole spectrum of likely contingencies rather than simply the least likely, ‘last-ditch defend the moat scenario'.

There is a significant possibility that submarines deployed under such a strategy will be in the wrong place at the wrong time and lack the ability to quickly reposition - it surrenders the initiative to the opponent who may well calculate that he should be able to avoid the defending submarines.

Such a capability has significantly less deterrent value.

The first decision for Government is to confirm the top-level requirements set out in the Defence White Paper as the target for concept development.

Starting from this strategic setting and the unique contribution that Australia's submarines can make in these circumstances, let us turn to consider how Australia can achieve the capability and the second of the core questions for the government.

MOTS or Developmental Project?
No current Western European conventional submarine design has the mobility, range, endurance or payload capacity required to meet the requirements set out above.

This is a matter of size.

Nor are they well adapted for the hot tropical waters in which Australia's submarines must operate.

The largest off-the-shelf European submarine potentially available is the S80A, under development for the Spanish Navy.

This is a new design and a first for Navantia.

It has yet to go to sea, so it is unproven.

Without the assistance of their earlier, more experienced partner, DCNS, this must be considered a risk.

Design performance will not be known until some time after it goes to sea, scheduled for 2014.

The S80A has approximately 30 per cent smaller dived displacement than a Collins class, illustrating the growth that will be required to reach a Collins capability, which itself falls short of the Defence White Paper requirement.

What is involved in stretching a submarine?

The first point to make is that once you start making such substantial modifications, it is no longer a military off-the-shelf option, but a developmental project.

In the case of submarines there are many complexities to be considered.

To simplify this considerably; there are two basic laws of physics that impact significantly in such an undertaking.

The first is that the submarine must be neutrally buoyant when submerged; it floats like an airship underwater.

A submarine has little capacity to accept additional weight eg from new equipment, additional fuel and personnel.

Once its small design margins for growth are exceeded, the only option is to increase the size of the submarine to regain the buoyancy required to offset the weights that have been added.

At this point the second key law kicks in. For maximum underwater efficiency and quietness the submarine must have a length:beam ratio within certain limits.

This restriction on the length to beam ratio determines that a substantial increase in volume cannot be simply achieved by adding length; the pressure hull diameter must be increased to maintain a suitable length to beam ratio for the new, larger volume.

Therefore, a European sourced Military-Off-The Shelf (MOTS) submarine is too small to meet the requirements.

Nor is stretching one a simple undertaking.

Australia is talking about a developmental project, with a larger diameter pressure hull - ie a new design, to achieve the requirement.

The second decision is to nominate the Collins as the nearest MOTS option.

This should provide the most appropriate and useful benchmark.

It is the lowest risk baseline from which to evaluate the development of the Future Submarine and benefits from extensive data gathered by operating in our environment.

Design options
In considering a developmental project Australia should consider the pertinent lessons learnt from the last two developmental submarine projects Australia has conducted; the Collins class and the Submarine Weapons Update (SWUP) Program for the Oberon class.

Because the submarine has been adapted or developed for Australia's requirements, Australia is the parent Navy.

This requires a significant level of design expertise to maintain, operate and develop the submarine through life, along with the engineering and design skills to safely oversee its operations; the equivalent of the airworthiness authority.

The current Collins debacle has demonstrated that underestimating this puts the submarine capability at risk.

Co-location in Australia is the cheapest and most effective solution for providing these essential services; Australia assumed design authority for the Collins class in 2001.

Being a parent can be expensive.

In the case of a submarine, the cost of acquisition is 25 - 30 per cent of the total cost of ownership; in-service support and operating costs make up the majority of the cost of ownership.

In developing the design, Australia should aim to minimise the total cost of ownership; if necessary being prepared to pay more in the acquisition phase to achieve a platform that will be cheaper to operate and therefore overall cheaper to own.

Turning to the options for the design development; two broad options exist -a European designer or an Australian design environment.

The major factors to be considered here are the risks and access to technology to reduce them.

In developing the design Australia should make maximum use of existing European and US submarine technologies to reduce risks and achieve the capability required.

Australia needs access to both European and US sources of technology.

The most sensitive information may not be available for love or money, additionally there will be some areas of the submarine where suitable equipment is not available; in both cases, solutions will have to be developed domestically.

For example it is unlikely that were there will be a suitable diesel generator for a submarine of this size (one of the problems that was encountered with the design of the Collins class) and a suitable production diesel generator will have to be ‘submarine-ised' for the purpose.

An R&D program will therefore be a key part of reducing risks, achieving the capability; it will be ongoing to maintain the capability edge that Australia seek.

The diesel example is at the low sensitivity end; there are other areas such as signature management and countermeasures where sensitivity will be a significant matter and access to state-of-the-art R&D capacity critical.

The need for Australia to develop the anechoic coating tiles to reduce Collins active sonar signature is an example of this category.

The design and its supporting R&D program must be undertaken with Australia's operational environment in mind and leverage off the significant experience Australia has gained in operating a large conventional submarine in it.

The design and the R&D program must be protected; it would be counter-productive to have advances achieved through this process simply exported into the region.

All the potential European designers offer submarines for export into our region.

The third decision is to use an Australian design environment.

This offers significant and unique advantages in its ability to access both European and US sourced submarine technologies; to protect this information to the satisfaction of the owners and to avoid advances achieved by an Australian led R&D program being exported back into our region.

It will maximise access to the Collins lessons, the submarine that is the closest starting point for the Future Submarine and ensure adequate design support for the parent navy role that is inevitable.

A design competition?
Would a design competition reduce the risks of undertaking design development?

Australia has significantly greater industry experience in submarine design and building than when it commenced the Collins project.

However, Australia has yet to undertake a full independent design; it will require significant assistance from our US and European capability partners to achieve - Australia is certainly not capable of managing two design developments.

Secondly, the Department of Defence's submarine engineering experience has shrunk considerably since the Collins project team was disbanded and the Department will now require external assistance to act as the informed customer for one such design process.

Finally, achieving a level playing field for two competitive designers will necessarily restrict the Defence Science and Technology Organisation's (DSTO) and key sections of Australian industry involvement in the design process, inhibiting the use of one of Australia's most valuable resources in the R&D component that will be essential to this project.

Should Australia run a modified European MOTS as a competitor or fallback to the Australian developed design?

This is essentially two developmental designs, possibly aimed at different capability outcomes - if the modified European MOTS design is not expected to meet the full requirement.

It maximises the drawbacks discussed above for a European designer.

In addition it will deny the Australian design environment full access to the Defence Department, DSTO and US support in order to sustain a ‘level playing field'.

It will significantly add to the Department's responsibilities and work.

It is likely to take significantly longer to arrange and conduct than a single design process.

Time is in short supply if the 2025 date is to be achieved, as are funds.

Finally, there is no reason to suppose that this course of action would improve the chances of achieving a compliant design, in fact spreading our limited resources across two design processes increases the risks up that neither design will achieve the requirement along with increased time, cost and schedule risk.

Neither the US nor Europe use such a process to undertake a submarine design development.

They follow a much more cohesive approach with integrated product teams working on the design from concept development to delivery to achieve the requirement.

The latest example of this is the Integrated Product Process Development (IPPD) process used for the Virginia class submarine design in the US.

Australia should aim for a single integrated product process development for the Australian design.

This process is aimed at minimising the cost of ownership of the capability.

The designer, builder, combat system integrator, major subsystem and equipment suppliers, maintainers, Navy DMO and DSTO all participate in an Integrated Product Team from concept development through to delivery of the final submarine.

This is a seamless process and avoids the stop start decision-making inherent in more traditional design processes.

It avoids issues over the ‘buildability' or maintainability of the design since those responsible for these aspects participate in the design process and sign off on their responsibilities progressively as the design is developed.

The experience with the Virginia design demonstrates significant improvements in the design performance and major savings in time and money.

The IPPD process is now mandatory for all US Navy design developments.

The fourth decision is to use an IPPD approach for a single, Australian design development process.

This maximises opportunity to exploit Defence and industry resources, builds strongly on our alliance links with the US whilst providing access to European sourced submarine technologies.

It offers significant benefits for Australian industry participation and opportunities to upgrade our industry processes.

So what?
The recent Defence White Paper has set a justifiable if challenging set of top level requirements for Australia's future submarine capability.

In order to achieve a viable deterrent and if necessary, an effective strategic sting, Australia requires a force of long-range, highly capable submarines, able to carry significant and flexible payloads to a potential adversaries sensitive areas.

There are no compliant MOTS options available from European submarine designers.

Even the largest design being developed falls well short of Collins in range, mobility, endurance and payload and is yet to be proven.

Modifying one of these designs will require a significant developmental project.

An updated Collins is a more appropriate benchmark, closest to our requirements and benefits from the operating experience gained in our environment.

A single Australian design development with access to US and European submarine design and technology support is the lowest risk path for achieving the capability.

This can only be achieved in the Australian design environment.

A modern, IPPD design development model will maximise Australia's opportunity to achieve the capability at the least risk.

The core decisions to be made by the government in initiating the concept development phase are therefore:
• To confirm the Defence White Paper requirement remains valid.
• A developmental project is required.
• An Australian design environment offers the least risk to achieve the capability for the lowest cost of ownership and within schedule/cost boundaries.
• A single developmental design should be undertaken, benchmarked against an updated Collins, using an IPPD model, accessing support from US and European submarine design and technology providers.

Disclaimer: Rear Admiral Peter Briggs AO CSC retired from the RAN in 2001 after a 39-year career as a submarine specialist.

He was the President of the Submarine Institute of Australia 2004-2009.