Countermeasures: Sea 1778 - A new mine warfare paradigm | ADM Sep 2010
The RAN is about to embark on a new course in Mine Warfare. Sea 1778 will acquire a Mine Counter Measures (MCM) capability which will eventually replace that of the Huon-class mine hunters; many of Australia’s allies are exploring similar approaches, but it’s not without risk.
Gregor Ferguson | Sydney
The 2009 Defence Capability Plan highlights an interesting convergence in maritime capability projects.
Project Sea 1180 aims to replace the RAN’s existing patrol boats Coastal Minehunters (MHC) and survey ships with a single, 20-strong class of Offshore Combatant Vessels (OCV) from about 2019.
The background to Sea 1778, say defence sources, is the Defence White Paper’s “predominantly maritime strategy for deterring and defeating attacks on Australia.
A key enabler for this strategy is that maritime forces are necessary to establish sea control and to project force in Australia’s maritime environment.”
Project Sea 1778 aims to acquire a deployable Mine Counter-Measures (MCM) system to equip RAN surface task groups with an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) between 2015-17.
This will be based on a system of organic MCM components that can be embarked in the ships of a deploying task group, and employed to overcome mine threats encountered during task group operations.
Because of the overlapping schedules of the two projects it is likely to be the template (and could be the early fielded solution) for the MCM capability embarked in the new OCVs.
The aim of Sea 1778 is to provide a maritime task group with sufficient MCM capability to maintain freedom of manoeuvre on the broader range of expeditionary operations enabled by the acquisition of the Canberra-class LHDs.
The project aims to install MCM capabilities on an ad hoc basis aboard ships in the task group.
This bestows an organic MCM capability which travels at the same speed – something the Navy’s four 12-knot Huon-class ships (two more are currently employed on patrol duties) can’t do.
In the longer term, of course, the Huons will be replaced by the OCVs.
However, this change demands a very different approach to the MCM task and is the underlying philosophy behind the OCV which will be equipped with remote sensing and mine disposal capabilities largely identical to those sought under Sea 1778.
However, the MCM capabilities acquired under Sea 1778 and Sea 1180 will still need to detect, identify and neutralise all types of sea mine, including ‘smart’ buried ground mines.
Early guidance suggests that about four OCVs at any one time will be equipped for MCM operations; in all likelihood Sea 1778 will aim to deliver a similar force structure.
Capability Development Group (CDG), Navy and the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) are working on the requirements phase of the capability development process, refining user needs and examining project options for First Pass between FY 2010-11 and 2011-12; a Rapid Prototyping Development and Evaluation (RPDE) task is also under way to help assist in the development of system employment concepts (see Julian Kerr’s article on Unmanned Underwater Vehicles in the August edition of ADM).
According to Defence sources, the deployable MCM system could be mounted on all classes of ship, up to and including the LHDs which are big enough to embark the full range of MCM modules.
In practice, the LHDs (indeed, all task group ships) are likely to be crammed with equipment, stores and people so space will be at a premium; a smaller, faster platform is more likely.
That said, the range of MCM systems proposed by the project will allow different effects to be delivered from a variety of maritime task group platforms, a Defence spokesperson told ADM: “The capability is likely to include a combination of manned and unmanned systems for use by Mine Warfare and Clearance Diving specialists attached to the MCD Commander’s organisation.
“After the First Pass, CDG is planning to assign DSTO with a number of tasks to get an understanding of task group MCM functionality, to address platform integration issues and reduce technical risks associated with SEA 1778 Ph1.”
The DCP talks of a preference for an in-service MOTS solution, but Defence doesn’t rule out some developmental work, if this can be justified on cost, risk and capability grounds.
And what will those capabilities be?
To allow task groups to operate safely from deep water to the surf zone, the capability likely to be required under Sea 1778 will be a mix of unmanned systems to detect and classify mines and other submerged targets, and then to neutralise them; unmanned vehicles to tow existing RAN minesweeping equipment such as the AMAS sweeps; and delivery platforms such as Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDV) for clearance divers.
This suite of equipment is likely to include small, medium and large UUVs; Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV), with and without sonar; multi-band sonars, including Synthetic Aperture Sonar (SAS) for high-resolution target imaging; boats such a Rigid-hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB) for clearance divers; an Expendable Mine Neutralisation System (EMNS); and possibly some sort of SDV.
Between them, this equipment would likely require several storage and transport containers, along with pallets of gas bottles and mobile recompression chamber to support divers.
A back of the envelope estimate suggests an equipment burden of as much as 10 tonnes with an embarked footprint the equivalent of several 20-foot ISO containers, which is a massive overhead on a tightly-packed warship.
Most of these equipments exist already in MOTS form: Europe is particularly strong in this regard, with Atlas Elektronik (teamed with Ultra), Kongsberg Defence and Saab all manufacturing critical elements of a deployable MCM system, in particular sensors and UUVs of different sizes, many of which have been evaluated here in Australia.
To avoid a significant developmental task Defence may be forced to look at solutions developed for similar deployable MCM requirements overseas by prime contractors who have already tackled the networking, communications and systems integration challenges involved.
Thales Australia is already doing research with the Australian Field Centre for Robotics (AFCR) on applications for Simultaneous Localisation and Mapping (SLAM) algorithms for Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV), with an eye on the future global market for deployable MCM capabilities.
The company is also working with Singapore’s Navy and DSTO on similar expeditionary MCM capabilities, including USVs to tow its TSM 2054 SAS.
The TSM 2054 is also being re-engineered for improved detection of buried ground mines.
And France’s Project ASEMAR also aims to develop an advanced UUV-based Minehunting capability based on Thales’s DUBM44 SAS integrated with a third party UUV.
Australia’s aspirations for deployable MCM seem to reflect the worldwide approach to expeditionary MCM: environmental and operational factors dictate a capability toolkit based on a system of systems, with each sub-system matched to deliver the best individual capability within the overall operational requirement.
What’s likely, however, is that no complete, integrated system currently exists which can do everything the RAN wants.
Defence will have to choose a prime contractor who can integrate well-matched and generally well-proven components from a range of suppliers.
The commercial risks in such an arrangement may be as onerous as the integration risks.
Defence will need a sound commercial process to choose and manage its prime contractor.