Authored by Andrew Davies, this Policy Analysis is the third (and final for the foreseeable future) Australian Strategic Policy Institute paper on the future of the Royal Australian Navy’s combat helicopter capability.
The previous two papers reviewed the capability and the policy issues relevant to the government decision expected in the first quarter next year.
Both of those papers concluded that the optimum strategy at the time was to wait until both of the contenders – the Sikorsky/Lockheed Martin MH60R (Romeo) version of the Seahawk and the NATO Helicopter Industries NH90 NFH – were in at least limited service and “at such time as operator experience with both types, operating in their full range of tasks, is available”.
Consistent with that advice, the government announced in February this year that it would run a competition between the two types, and decide between them in 2011.
In the intervening time, it is fair to say that events have tended to favour one of the contenders ahead of the other.
The Romeo has gone from strength to strength in its role with the US Navy (USN) and has proven to be remarkably reliable and capable after a smooth service introduction.
The fleet has amassed more than 50,000 flying hours and most of the reliability
indicators for the type’s mission systems are higher than the specified values. Seventy?six aircraft have been delivered to date, and the eventual number is likely to be 250-300 for the USN, plus exports.
The NFH has also made progress.
The first aircraft were delivered to the Dutch and French navies for operational trials and evaluation in April 2010.
The French aircraft will transition to service in late 2011.
Norwegian and Italian aircraft are also due for delivery soon.
The total order book for the NFH is now over 100.
By the time Australian aircraft are delivered (if Australia goes with the NFH), they will join 40 other NFHs which will have achieved over 13,500 flying hours (the overall fleet of more than 200 NH90s will have 80,000 hours up.)
Davies also points out that the decision could have been pushed to the right even more, given the life left in the RAN Seahawk fleet that has flown only about a third of the hours compared with their USN counterparts.