ADM Editorial: To MOTS or not to MOTS | ADM March 2012
Katherine Ziesing | Canberra
When dealing with all ‘projects land’ it’s hard to go past the two big vehicle programs: Land 121 Project Overlander and Land 400. The various phases of Overlander have long been examined on the pages of ADM over the years and this edition is no exception.
Ph 3 is covered in our From the Source interview this month with Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles Australia managing director Mike Riley and Ph 4 with an update on the development of the Hawkei from Thales under the Manufactured and Supported in Australia (MSA) option. In regard to Project Overlander, it has been excellent to see some movement on approvals in recent months (see P18) as the program has sorely needed some good news.
Phase 4 for the Protected Mobility Vehicle Light (PMV-L) is now the battleground as the case for each of the options is considered. To recap, there are three for government to eventually choose from: the US-developed Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) where Australia has contributed $40 million in development funds; the MSA option mentioned earlier; and market available vehicle (MAV). ADM understands that the MAV option is not being actively explored or even pursued at this time but that may change dependent on prevailing political winds.
JLTV has seen its own problems in the US with issues surrounding weight (the Marines are very keen for the vehicle to be light enough to be carried under a Chinook helicopter) versus protection trade offs. While some things can be negotiated in contracts, basic physics is not one of them. The parallel development path that was spoken about at previous Land Environment Working Group meetings may be significantly altered by the differing timelines that MSA and JLTV now present. But what happened to MAV?
Given the stated aim to have an off-the-shelf comparison for projects under consideration, where is that now? Both MSA and JLTV are developmental in every sense of the word. Hawkei has proved to be a success thus far but this is over a very short distance.
While Thales is making every effort to design the vehicle to minimise production and sustainment costs, measuring these concisely for the life-of-type is extremely difficult, nearing on the impossible. It’s almost like asking the IT department how many unscheduled outages they’re planning on dealing with for a year. You can make a good guess, but it’s still a guess until you look back and have some solid data to work with.
The testing program that JLTV is operating under has been running much longer, with prototypes clocking well over the 100,000 mile mark. The program is also facing cost pressures. At the end of January, the US Army Contracting Command in charge of JLTV issued a document outlining how the vehicle cost should not exceed US$250,000 per general purpose unit, the variant that Australia would most likely aim for. And this is all in the context of the US defence environment which is coming under increasing budgetary pressure. The future of the program is by no means certain.
Both JLTV and Hawkei have their supporters and detractors for various reasons. But little has been heard for the MAV from either camp. There were two MAV contenders considered as part of the earlier MSA option with the Ocelot (not exactly proven but chosen by the UK in an arguably similar PMV-L competition) and Eagle IV (in service with the German and Danish Armies). ADM understands that both were able to fulfil the MSA requirements requested.
Each had engaged with Australian industry to fulfil the MSA requirements, for both production and sustainment. But every competition has winners and losers, that’s the nature of business. Regardless of the acquisition model pursued, hopefully there will be PMV-L wheels on the ground according to schedule.
And that will be the key for Land 400 as well: schedule. Some industry figures have already questioned the long lead time of Land 400 vehicles given that the oft repeated phrase of ‘off the shelf’ that has become a touchstone for all public defence comment on the program.
Perhaps it is due to the fact that Australia has never bought anything off the shelf and then left it as is. There is always some element of Australianisation to be done in-country, usually on the C4I front. Every platform becomes a system of systems, even trucks and vehicles, it seems. Systems integration is a growing field and will only continue to increase in complexity as technology similarly increases. And Land 400 platforms will have to be integrated with legacy Army platforms. And RAAF assets. And RAN assets. And coalition assets.
Leaving ample time to address this issue fully is a sign of preparedness, one could argue. For there will be arguments on Land 400 as it progresses over what constitutes off the shelf and manageable schedule and cost risks with whichever solution is pursued.
I would also like to make a correction from last month. We optimistically announced that an RFT had been issued for Air 5428 in February’s Air Power edition. This is in fact not the case. Our sincerest apologies for getting your hopes up.