A View from Canberra: Carrier clairvoyance | ADM February 2012

A Special Correspondent | Canberra

The RAN is now fundamentally a frigate and submarine force and has been for the last 30 years. But coming out of World War Two, it saw itself as a carrier force since carriers had proved fundamental to victory in the Pacific. The navy planned for three but ended up with two, both surplus Royal Navy vessels. Sydney, launched in 1944, was paid off in 1973 while Melbourne remained in service as the navy pondered a replacement.

Those plans proceeded right through the late 1970s with the Fraser government agreeing in August 1980 to acquire a purpose built vessel operating anti-submarine helicopters and, potentially, short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft. Gone was any thought of a vessel primarily operating modern fast jets.

Various US, Spanish and Italian designs were assessed until the UK, undergoing one of its periodic fire sales of surplus capability, decided it no longer needed HMS Invincible which could become HMAS Australia for the modest sum of $478 million. On February 25, 1982, the government decided this was too good a deal to ignore.

This was a near new 22,000 tonne light carrier, launched in 1977 and commissioned in 1980 and available far sooner and cheaper than a new vessel. Were it not for the Argentine invasion of the Falklands on April 2, 1982, Invincible would have been ours and likely still in service. With our very own carrier, would we have needed HMA Ships Manoora and Kanimbla? And would we again now be debating a replacement?

As it was, Invincible headed to the South Atlantic and played such a vital role in the Falklands repossession operation that the UK set about rethinking its force structure. Fraser duly advised that Australia was willing to cancel the deal and that’s what happened.

Britain came back with another offer – a brand new Invincible-class carrier for $760 million for delivery in 1989 with sale or lease of HMS Hermes, another Falklands veteran, in the meantime.  There was another potential sweetener – the tantalising prospect of constructing one or two heavy landing ships to replace Falkland losses.

Hermes was familiar to the RAN as it had been declared surplus in the mid-1960s with Australia seriously considering it as a Melbourne replacement.  We said no then and no again to this second offer. Curiously, Hermes remains alive as INS Viraat, flagship of the Indian navy and the last of the WW2 era carriers still in service.

By early 1983 plans for a carrier had evaporated. In under a year, Australia had moved from near certain acquisition of a Melbourne replacement to dropping the idea entirely.  The final act was an early decision of the new Hawke Labor government, elected in March 1983, but the Fraser government had set this course in January 1983.

When the Fraser government cabinet sat down to consider this at its meeting in January 1983, cost was the fundamental issue. Defence minister Ian Sinclair said across the defence force, only the navy wanted a carrier.

Navy argued valiantly that a carrier would be highly useful in a variety of scenarios involving protection of shipping, anti-submarine operations and maritime strike. Not that useful, everyone else said, pointing out that a carrier offered no significant advantage over other planned or current defence assets. New Seahawk helicopters flying from the new FFG frigates would provide an anti-submarine capability while land-based aircraft – F-111s plus soon to arrive F/A-18 Hornets – backed by in-flight refuelling could provide air cover for more remote operations.

Moreover, the only available STOVL aircraft, the British Harrier, was deficient without an airborne early warning capability. Harriers had performed impressively in the Falklands but at great tactical advantage against Argentine aircraft at the extreme end of their range. Harriers would likely be well outclassed by the type of aircraft set to operate in the region including Indonesian F-16s.

The clincher seems to have been the breathtaking costs – $1.5 billion for a carrier of the Invincible class, along with helicopters and aircraft, plus $80 million a year to operate. The annual defence budget stood around $4.5 billion and the economy was in strife with Treasurer John Howard warning of an increasing deficit.

Moreover, defence was heavily committed to other new kit – the Hornets and not that far down the track, submarines and frigates. Sinclair warned that a carrier would jeopardise important immediate plans and require others to be rescheduled or cancelled. It was no contest.

Sinclair predicted shrieks of outrage from the “carrier lobby” of retired and serving naval officers but acquiescence from everyone else and that’s pretty much what happened. So ended Australia’s near-four decade era as a carrier power.

With the arrival of the new Canberra-class landing helicopter dock (LHD) ships, that could change again. These are big vessels, displacing around 30,000 tonnes (Invincible was 22,000 tonnes) with defence still striving to realise their diverse operational potential, including for regional power projection.

They can also operate fixed wing aircraft. One of the many reasons Australia opted for no carrier back in 1983 was limited Harrier performance with Sinclair observing that prospects for a supersonic STOVL aircraft were highly speculative.

“There are no significant government-funded R&D programs and no indications that one will be undertaken,” he said. Well there is now, with the Joint Strike Fighter being developed in STOVL and carrier variants. Spain plans to fly JSF from their LHD.

The government and navy say there are no plans for flying JSF from our LHDs, and doing so would be neither simple or cheap. But once JSF is in RAAF service in a decade’s time and maritime versions are mature, this might not seem such a big step.