On 5 August Australia signed an agreement with the UK and US that will allow AUKUS Pillar One to proceed. The agreement supersedes the existing Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement that was signed and ratified in 2022 by the three governments.
The proposed agreement will be scrutinised by the Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) before it is ratified. Should it enter into force in its current form, the agreement will expire on 31 December 2075, assuming no participant-elects withdraw from the agreement by providing at least one year’s written notice to the other parties.
It could also be terminated if Australia detonated a nuclear weapon or breached its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
“This agreement is an important step towards Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy,” said Minister for Defence Richard Marles.
In comparison to the earlier Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement, which only permitted the communication and exchange of information about US and UK naval nuclear propulsion technology to Australia, the new agreement is more material. Whilst it maintains Australian access to information, it also allows for the transfer of physical things, namely equipment and naval nuclear material to Australia. Because the agreement is trilateral, it will support both Australia’s future second-hand Virginia class submarines as well as the domestically built SSN-AUKUS boats.
Due to the enhanced sensitivity of the new agreement compared to its predecessor, it imposes a number of new obligations and conditions on Australia and its handling of atomic information - locally known as Southern Apex information - in Australia. These include a requirement that, before any material or equipment can be transferred under the agreement, Australia will have to conclude an Article 14 agreement with the IAEA.
An Article 14 agreement is an arrangement with the IAEA that allows Australia to use nuclear material - in this case Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) - that is required to be safeguarded by the IAEA for non-nuclear weapons purposes, in this case naval nuclear propulsion. Its purpose is to prevent nuclear material that could be used for nuclear weapons from being diverted for that purpose. Australia began formally negotiating an Article 14 agreement with the IAEA in March 2023.
The agreement also prevents the Australian Government from ever enriching, producing, or reprocessing nuclear fuel domestically for the purposes of naval nuclear propulsion. It also forbids Australia from acquiring nuclear fuel for naval nuclear propulsion from another source besides the two other AUKUS countries or arming its nuclear-powered submarines with nuclear weapons.
Australia will also indemnify the US and UK against any damages or losses related to the transfer of naval nuclear material to Australia, aside from any claims that originate from former US Navy (USN) submarines that enter service with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).
The agreement also has an impact on Australian defence industry as it includes a binding commitment to share, royalty-free, any inventions or improvements developed by Australia relating to naval nuclear propulsion technology. The UK and US already have a similar arrangement in place because of the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement.
Accompanying the 20-page agreement is a two-page non-binding “political understanding” signed by all three countries that will last for the duration of the agreement. It states that the UK and US will make their “best effort” to transfer equipment and material to Australia, it also states that they will “not unreasonably” withhold information, equipment or material from Australia. However, it also puts the needs of the US and UK ahead of Australia.
“The Governments affirm that cooperation under the Agreement is to be carried out in such a manner as to not adversely affect the ability of the United States and the United Kingdom to meet their respective military requirements and to not degrade their respective naval nuclear propulsion programs,” the Understanding states.