Land Force: CBRN - Protecting the ADF from the CBRN threat | ADM Feb 2009

A little-known but high priority project is underway to increase the Australian Defence Force's (ADF's) ability to operate in a chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear (CBRN) environment.

Julian Kerr

 Few details have been released on JP2110, whose genesis derives from a Chief of Defence Force directive in October 2005 that is believed to have been driven by the increased threat of CBRN attack by terrorists.

An additional concern has been the possibility of Australian forces on deployment encountering toxic industrial hazards, as has reportedly occurred in East Timor.

The object of JP2110, currently costed at up to $200 million, is to deliver high payoff elements of a CBRN capability to the ADF to immediately increase operational capability in contaminated surroundings.

Phase 1A, with a year of decision in 2009, involves the acquisition of additional MOTS/COTS chemical and radiological point source detectors for distribution to the wider ADF.

This phase is costed at less than $50 million.

It builds on existing in-service capabilities and full operating capability is scheduled for 2011.

Phase 1B, currently in its infancy, is costed at $100-150 million and involves improved individual protective ensembles (IPEs); personnel, vehicle and sensitive equipment decontamination; and the introduction of a networked warning and reporting system.

The year of decision for Phase 1B is 2011, and the scheduling of initial and full operating capability has yet to be decided.

Although a project office has yet to be established by the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), work is being progressed by an integrated product team (IPT) of 25-30 people chaired by Lieutenant-Colonel Warren Jolly, Deputy Director Engineering and CBRNE (the E is for Explosives) within the Land Development section of the Capability Development Group (CDG).

Members of the IPT are drawn from the three services, DMO, and the Human Protection and Performance (HPPD) division of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO).

The division describes itself as the only research group in Australia that focuses on defence against CBRN threats and works to counter these threats and their impacts.

According to Major Mark McAuliffe, Staff Officer Engineering in the Land Development branch of the CDG and a member of the IPT, HPPD assists with requirements definitions and some test and evaluation activities.

However, while a large part of HPPD's work involves direct support of Special Operations Command's Incident Response Regiment (IRR), MAJ McAuliffe said JP2110 was aimed towards the wider ADF.

MAJ McAuliffe described Phase 1A as "basic threat detection."

While detectors were already distributed across the defence force, capability gaps existed and the intention was to plug these, not only in army but also in the other services.

"Phase 1B is more complex; it's improving systems that we already have, but also networking some of the detectors with command and control systems, together with software to deal with hazard prediction and modelling."

MAJ McAuliffe acknowledged the benefit of being able to draw on the experience of allies, some details of which were disclosed in a recent unclassified HPPD report concerning information-sharing on the development of CBR Battlespace Information Systems (BIS).

The report, covering the September 2007 meeting of a BIS Information Systems Working Group (ISWG) attended by Australia, Canada, the UK and the US, recommended that Australia contribute towards a common AUSCANUKUS BIS framework.

The development of such a framework could benefit Australia by giving access to elements of the BIS systems of the other countries, the report said.

Should resources be available after JP2110 first pass, Australia should try to contribute to this effort by developing modules for a common system, or by testing systems and components.

The BIS being developed by the four member countries have common goals: to provide warning of CBR releases and to assist decision-making in response to releases.

Meanwhile Australia should request access - already granted to the UK - to the J/WARN and JEM components of the US BIS under the terms of the CBR Memorandum of Understanding signed by Australia and the US in August 2006.

Should these elements not meet the needs of JP2110, it would be necessary to ascertain whether they could be modified, either domestically or by their US developers, the report stated.

JWARN is a computer-based command and control application and networks directly with CBR sensors through a joint component interface device.

The JWARN mission application software automatically receives alerts from sensors, generates plots of hazardous areas, displays plumes and hazard areas on the Common Operational Picture, and generates warning messages to units in the vicinity of the contamination.

JEM provides both real time and planning modelling and simulation solutions to predict and track CBR and TIM (Toxic Industrial Materials) impacts.

With procurement of the UK's BIS cancelled, Canada still assessing its own requirements and confirmation by Defence that Australia is now negotiating the supply of JWARN and JEM software, US applications seem destined to play a major role in coalition BIS.

Meanwhile the same HPPD report referred to Australian representation at fusion field trials at the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah in September 2007 that were intended to provide data on the characteristics of wind-dispersed CBR releases.

Full data from the trials was not expected to be available until well into 2008, and would be analysed over a number of years to add to the knowledge of atmospheric dispersion, the report said.

Such cooperation enhances the interoperability in CBRNE between Australia and its major allies which is already benefiting from the emphasis on COTS/MOTS solutions wherever practicable.

For the ISWG, the key goal is to facilitate interoperability between the BIS of the four member countries, whatever system or systems may ultimately be selected.

This includes the standardisation of data types representing hazard information as well as the sharing of model components, validation and testing procedures.

For the IPT, the challenge is in determining what technologies should be pursued within timeframes that are described by the CDG as "tight."

"There are numerous alternatives out there and some intense marketing by industry.

"Because we're looking at so many different areas, there are a lot of issues to be considered and it's a challenge to get your head around all the options and ensure we select what's best in terms of both effectiveness and value for money," MAJ McAuliffe stated.