Defence Business: Sirius supply stalwarts Success | ADM May 08

1 May 2008

By Abraham Gubler

The conversion of the MT Delos into HMAS Sirius has been the posterboy of successful DMO projects.

But there have been issues with the conversion and the capability delivered.

The commissioning of HMAS Sirius in mid September 2006 after an innovative acquisition strategy was to be a crowning achievement for the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO).

For the first time they had been given a chance to manage a high profile project, Sea 1654 Phase 2A, from conception to in-service delivery in their own right without an inherited legacy of suspect acquisition and project management decisions.

While HMAS Sirius was a success in many areas, coming in under budget and ahead of schedule, the story has soured for Defence with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) expressing a lack of satisfaction with the capability and foreshadowing replacement before the planned 15 year service life.

The acquisition and conversion of the Merchant Tanker (MT) Delos into the HMAS Sirius enabled Defence to leverage the low initial cost of commercial vessel tonnage.

The mass produced MT Delos was acquired for only $52 million and converted for under $70 million represents a significant saving from any comparable vessel built to military specification.

However, the cost savings from capturing the commercial cost base amount for little if the vessel can't be or isn't modified to meet key RAN capability requirements.

HMAS Sirius's main problems lie in the lack of useable aviation capability with the overhanging flight deck, her use of non-standard fuel and inadequate speed precluding task group operations.

Defence has only cleared HMAS Sirius for day vertical replenishment (VERTREP) and helicopter transfer operations for Seahawk, Black Hawk and Chinooks.

During these operations the helicopters do not land on the flight deck but hover above it.

No landing here please
Defence has advised ADM that the "flight deck was not designed [for], nor is it capable of conducting underway landings with helicopters of any type."

While this contradicts the very definition of a flight deck it also contradicts such material as the HMAS Sirius conversion Technical Data Packs (TDP) prepared by design agents Australian Marine Technologies and the Tenix Marine product brochure that indicates the HMAS Sirius is capable of "landing medium size helicopters up to Sea King or Merlin size".

Also Defence's own promotional graphic of HMAS Sirius shows a helicopter landed on the fight deck, though perhaps ironically and suitably this is a Seasprite.

Sources from within Defence have also indicated that landing trials were attempted but HMAS Sirius's flight deck was not cleared for regular use but only landings in cases of emergency.

Making operating HMAS Sirius more complex than the balance of the RAN fleet is its medium speed diesel engine being only able to run on merchant fleet standard fuel oil.

The rest of the RAN's fleet operates on diesel fuel which can only be used in medium speed diesel engines if they are fitted with a fuel heater, which HMAS Sirius is not.

The requirement for fuel oil has lead Defence to arrange for a supply direct to HMAS Sirius on an as required basis.

While Defence will include fuel oil in the next request for tender (RFT) for a standing offer of fuel it will add complexity and cost to fuels management especially in an operational environment.

While HMAS Sirius received its Initial Operational Release it is yet to receive 18 months later the Operational Release by the Chief of Navy, Commander Australian Naval Systems Command and Maritime Commander Australia, indicating their satisfaction that the vessel is in all respects suitable for operational service.

Operational Release was planned to be achieved by mid 2007 according to Defence.

The primary cause of the shortfalls in underway replenishment (UNREP) capability is courtesy of the cost driven decision to replace the legacy capability, HMAS Westralia - itself a cost driven acquisition - with a similar class of vessel, the Auxiliary Oilier (AO).

HMAS Westralia was only acquired because of massive cost overruns in the construction of HMAS Success in the 1980s.

HMAS Success was to be the first of two AORs (Auxiliary, Oil and Replenishment) able to provide fuels, ammunition and other stores to naval vessels while also supporting command and control (C2) and helicopter operations.

With the funding for two ships consumed by building the first ship the RAN acquired a second hand British AO, RFA Appleleaf, in 1989 and renamed her HMAS Westralia.

Apples and oranges
AOs are usually conceived as being a second line of the fleet train replenishing the AOR so as to allow it to stay in the forward deployed area.

While making sense for large Navy's like the US Navy and the old Royal Navy for small navies like the RAN the periodic nature of ship refit and widely dispersed basing of the fleet mean that any AO will spend much of its time as the sole available UNREP capability.

Subsequently the AO's low speed (HMAS Sirius can only sustain 15 knots, compared to the 20 knots cruising speed of frigates and LHDs) and lack of full support capability means that if an AOR is unavailable, as was the case until March 31 this year while HMAS Success was in refit, the RAN is unable of providing UNREP capability as an integral part of a naval task group.

Further like most tankers HMAS Sirius's propulsion unit is customized for steady cruising on a sustained course and lacks the kind of manoeuvrability needed to service a task group's refuelling needs.

But this is not new; the Defence White Paper of 2000 identified the shortfall in HMAS Westralia's capability and noted that both support ships (including HMAS Success) should be replaced be a common class of AOR.

Defence reported that HMAS Westralia's shortcomings included "limited facilities and the inability to land on the flight deck aft means a reduced aviation capability that degrades afloat support effectiveness; the ship's maximum speed (16 knots) prevents full integration into any task group that requires flexibility by operating at higher speeds; and a C2 system that lacks the ability to integrate with a task group."

While HMAS Sirius has a full naval communications and intelligence suite, through not a data sharing C2 system, these shortcomings have been passed onto the replacement.

This lack of satisfaction with HMAS Sirius has lead to loud discussions within Capability Development Group (CDG) and industry of re-jigging the Maritime Operational Support Capability plan.

By extending the life of HMAS Success with a double hull modification the balance of the $450-600 million forward funding estimate for her replacement, Sea 1654 Phase 3, would then be used to acquire a purpose built UNREP ship to replace the HMAS Sirius mid to late next decade.

The obvious problem with this plan is the high risk or relying on a refitted HMAS Success for many years beyond its planned retirement date of 2015.

While there are many proven and highly capable options for a military specific AOR available they are all high cost and the $450-600 million would not be sufficient for two ships, especially if significant Australian industry participation was included.

Future options
One attractive option is combining the plus sides of the HMAS Sirius acquisition, capturing the commercial cost base by converting a merchant ship, with the capability inherent in an AOR not an AO.

During the Sea 1654 Phase 2A early definition a study was conducted into converting a merchant containership into an AOR with extensive fuel tanks.

Such a conversion, which would involve adding the cargo fuel tanks to the interior of the ship, was judged too risky at that time for Australian industry.

Rolls-Royce have subsequently prepared a detailed design of such a commercially manufactured containership conversion, using their proven 2,500 TEU (Twenty foot Equivalent Units) container design, to a double hulled AOR.

The design features of the containership 'donor ship' are better suited to conversion to a naval UNREP vessel than a tanker thanks to their design.

The amidships superstructure enables a conventional aft flight deck and hangar to be installed and the propulsion unit allows high speed (over 20 knots), manoeuvrability for task group UNREP and engine room capacity for fuel heaters (allowing diesel fuel operation).

The major cell bulkheads are well positioned for division into the fuels, lube oil, and fresh water tanks required.

This allows plentiful liquids to be carried, 24,000 cubic metres in addition to 4,800 for own use, along with significant dry stores including 5,100 cubic metres internally plus 42 TEU containers.

Rolls-Royce have advised ADM that such a conversion would be within the cost and complexity benchmarks of the HMAS Sirius conversion though the donor ship would be of higher cost than the Delos.

Only 3,000 tonnes of steel need to be added to the ship and the structure work is relatively simple thanks to the donor ship's cellular design.

Further the design has potential to convert the vessel back to its original commercial role to maximise return on investment at disposal.

As part of the DMO's desire to establish a world class project management organisation General Manager Systems Kim Gillis ordered the commissioning of a detailed history of the HMAS Sirius project to be written and published in book form.

The book has been written and despite Kim Gillis's original intent of publishing it for the public 'warts and all' it will now no longer be publicly available.

One of the clear lessons learnt from HMAS Sirius is that innovation in acquiring systems is to be encouraged but there is not substitute for getting the original capability definition right.

With HMAS Success and HMAS Sirius both needing replacement early-mid next decade using the conversion of a commercial build strategy will enable two vessels to be acquired within the budget but they must be capable of carrying out the AOR role.