Land Warfare: A lot of ground to cover | ADM Mar 08

1 March 2008

By Julian Kerr

Chief of Army, General Peter Leahy, used his keynote speech to the 2007 Land Warfare Conference to warn that technical superiority did not translate automatically to pervasive situational awareness in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

While the current US surge in Iraq was built around the pervasive presence of land forces, the previous scheme of manoeuvre relied too heavily on superiority in mobility and firepower.

This involved attempts to fuse a complex array of human and electronic sensors and identify insurgent targets for direct action.

While there had been some spectacular successes - the strike that killed the Jordanian jihadist Al Zaqarewi being a notable example - such operations were not the best way to defeat an insurgency among the people.

"Supporting our centre of gravity - namely the respect and loyalty of the people - requires a more comprehensive, enduring and nuanced approach", he commented.

No unmanned drone or aircraft could provide the persistent, loitering presence which was vital to isolating the insurgent from the population, both physically and emotionally.

"SIGINT and precision targeting are terrific force multipliers.

"But in operations of this type there is no substitute for a well-trained, resolute, decent, compassionate soldier on the ground to provide a sense of security to the civilian population".

General Leahy agreed that high-tech enablers such as the rifle that can shoot around corners, and devices for seeing and hearing through walls, were of great benefit, as were any systems or devices that increased precision targeting.

"My concern is that we are already well-served in this area", he commented.

"Our real limitations lie in the soft, or non-kinetic realm.

"Technology is part of a system that comprises human beings.

"If they are flying blind because of lack of HUMINT or a nuanced understanding of our environment, then technical aids cannot redeem the situation".

General Leahy pointed out that coalition troops in Iraq and Afghanistan patrolled in highly visible vehicles and uniforms with distinctive colour schemes and markings, through complex terrain in which the enemy was indistinguishable from the very people the coalition was trying to help.

"They report our movements using readily available mobile phones, using a language unfamiliar to most of our troops.

"They are the home team.

"Who do you think enjoys information superiority in this environment?"

Priorities
Two separate papers presented at the conference focused on the demands arising from the growing range of ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) capabilities, and called for improvements in Army's ISTAR management.

Colonel John Blaxland, of Headquarters Joint Operational Command (HQJOC), saw challenges in the timely processing and dissemination of accurate and relevant value-added information.

To date, the various components of the ISTAR domain had developed in a number of poorly linked 'stovepipes' of specialisations, Colonel Blaxland wrote.

"Indeed, it is largely due to the goodwill and professionalism of the individuals concerned, that the stovepipes have not tuned into 'smokestacks.'

"This approach has worked so far more by good will and individual competence rather than by design", he added.

One exciting development was the emergence of HQJOC with an intelligence branch under a one-star Director General Intelligence that was also integrally linked to the strategic intelligence agency, the Defence Intelligence Organisation.

However, Army's corps-specific approach to the management of the various ISTAR functions was no longer satisfactory.

An officer trained in electronic warfare (EW) was well advised not to linger in the EW domain if he or she was to value a successful career in the Signals Corps.

The same held true for those in the Intelligence Corps, and in the survey domain of the Royal Australian Engineers.

"This approach is no longer tenable.

"After all, the Army needs to foster such specialists to a greater extent than ever before, offering them career prospects that don't frighten them into leaving the Army too soon."

Reorganisation needed
Colonel Blaxland suggested a reorganisation of Army's ISTAR components which would see the brigading of ISTAR assets within Land Command with a clear ISTAR 'champion' identified, and the holistic management of ISTAR training domains within a single directorate of Training Command.

He also recommended the creation of an ISTAR staff management training program that encompassed officers from all ISTAR domains, much as has already taken place with all-combat-arms training.

Major Steven Magi of the Australian Command and Staff College noted that ISTAR capabilities were managed discreetly along corps-specific lines that crossed a significant number of organisational and corps boundaries, each with different roles, tasks and responsibilities.

"Due to the fact that each capability was introduced over different timeframes and in response to different requirements they are often not interoperable with each other or other Defence systems, complicating NCW initiatives," he wrote.

Army ISTAR doctrine was prolific, often aimed at an individual corps, and in many cases was dated and did not align with the Army's future concepts.

There was therefore a requirement to rationalise the number of ISTAR-related publications and, more importantly, update them to reflect not only current operations but also those required into the future.

Additionally, within the confines of the Army's Continuous Modernisation Process (ACMP) the Army should be developing operating concepts that identified the potential applications for advanced technologies.

These ranged from swarming ground and aerial vehicles at 'nano-bot' scale to 'Smartdust', a hypothetical network of tiny microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) sensors, robots or devices titled 'motes' and fitted with wireless communications.

"Currently, the Army is reliant on DSTO and the access it has to the advanced technology research offices of foreign nations for this support", Major Magi pointed out.

"However, as the ISTAR system is not viewed holistically this research is often not synchronised within the Army and externally with Defence".

In the exhibition area, the first overt signs of quickening interest in Land 400 - the $1 billion to $1.5 billion program for the replacement of the Army's ASLAV and M113AS3 armoured vehicles - were apparent.

Overseas experience
Although the scheduled year of decision for Land 400 is set between 2011 and 2014, developments in the UK's FRES (Future Rapid Effect System) program are being closely monitored both by industry and by Defence.

FRES is intended to develop a new family of medium-weight, network-capable armoured vehicles for the British army.

Australia has official observer status on the program, the utility element of which is being competed for by the ARTEC (Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, Rheinmetall Landsysteme and Stork) Boxer, General Dynamics Piranha, and the Nexter (previously GIAT) VBCI - all of whom were exhibiting at LWC.

At the lower end of the land systems scale, both the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) and BAE Systems Australia were exhibiting experimental Unmanned Ground Vehicles which could eventually emerge as operational platforms.

The DSTO's Growler (Ground-Based Weaponised Light Experimental Robot) testbed is intended to investigate the utility of remotely-operated weapon systems in a range of ADF operational scenarios.

The Growler vehicle is based on the commercially-developed Polaris Ranger all-terrain vehicle.

Powered by a 683cc, two cylinder engine that drives all six wheels, it is capable of speeds up to 70kph, and can carry 794kg.

The testbed is fitted with the in-service Kongsberg Remote Weapons Station (RWS), which can be fitted with a .50 calibre machinegun.

The RWS is controlled by an operator via a remote control joystick, using information gathered by visual and thermal cameras and a laser rangefinder fitted to the gun mount.

Additional information such as vehicle position, speed and attitude is also available to the operator.

Work on the Growler test bed is planned to continue for several more years, moving towards a prototype concept demonstration vehicle.

The BAE Systems Australia unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) is being developed as part of an integrated network of unmanned automous platforms that includes Kingfisher 1 and Kingfisher 2 Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs).

The UAVs are fully autonomous, but can be operated remotely for maximum control over experimental missions.

The complete integrated UXV experimentation system has evolved from BAE Systems' UAV Experimentation System, which was developed to support BAE Systems Australia's UAV, Network Centric Warfare demonstration programs.

The UXV system is being used to explore a wide range of autonomy and robotics technologies and capabilities that offer increased Land Force survivability.

The UGV uses as its base platform the operationally-proven Supercat Mk3 6x6.

This has been fitted with an actuation package and autonomous mission system, while retaining manual drive capability.

The autonomous vehicle system and mission command system are derivatives of systems developed for, and proven in, the Kingfisher, Raven, Corax and Herti Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs).

The mission system includes a suite of navigation, targeting and situational awareness sensors including an Inertial Measurement Unit/Global Positioning System which allows way point navigation, an electro/optical/infra-red turret, and stero vision forward-looking cameras.

Since vision can be confused by shadows, camera output is fused with data from dual scanning laser rangefinders.

Integrated trials involving the UGV and a Kingfisher UAV are scheduled for mid-2008.

The UXV system has also been offered for involvement in a joint UK/US/Australian research and development project into autonomous capabilities.