Tom Muir | Canberra
Their concerns are that having been virtually excluded from introducing important improvements to the current Collins submarine combat system, what opportunities are they likely to find in the ongoing development of the future submarine’s combat system if, as the Navy has already indicated, it will be based on the AN/BYG-1 tactical control system?
As is common knowledge, the original combat system designed for the Collins submarine was overly ambitious for the technology of the period. It was based on a fully federated system with all workstations expected to display information from the many and varied sensors with little regard for the quality, extent and volume of data they had to process. In light of the many problems, especially with the Tactical Data Handling System (THHS), a rolling upgrade program was introduced to fast track the elimination of faults. At the same time a competition was underway for a new MOTS combat system, for which the German ISUS 90-55 was selected.
In December 1999, the Minister for Defence announced the approval to upgrade the combat system in HMAS Dechaineux and Sheean as a fast track interim solution under the direction of RADM Peter Briggs. In approving the Combat System Augmentation (CSA) program, it was stipulated that any implementation had to be achieved within the programmed maintenance periods so operational availability would not be impacted.
Moreover, the upgrade had to be completed such that the first submarine would be operational by December 2000. The requirement to work within the extant submarine program posed a significant constraint on the CSA project.
It was the USN’s remedial support for the shortcomings of the Collins combat system, as well as assistance in other areas, such as acoustics, that lay behind the mid-2001 decision by the Defence Minister John Moore, not to proceed with the combat system competition. Put bluntly the USN was not prepared to continue providing technical assistance, including access to weapons data, if the European ISUS combat system was installed in the Collins submarines
This was the genesis for the Statement of Principles whereby the Australian and US navies were entering a comprehensive arrangement to maximise cooperation on submarine matters. An MOU on joint development of the AN/BYG-1 followed.
This meant a continuation of the CSA program, for the two fast track submarines, which saw the replacement of the troublesome TDHS entirely, using an evolutionary approach. The upgrade also developed interface gateways to bypass deficient software areas on the existing combat system, and to act as a new ‘connector’ between sonar sets, crew and weapons, re-scoping system specifications to remove the technical difficulty and high-effort/low-priority items.
Along with the welcome assistance of the Naval Undersea Warfare Centre (NUWC), which reportedly contributed 16 per cent to the effort, Australian small-to-medium enterprises provided the technical expertise and facilities for the platform and combat system augmentation.
For example, Acacia delivered three shipsets of its newly developed Tactical Data Management System, purchased by the RAN as part of the Collins combat system augmentation. Cirrus, specialist in real time data management software, supplied and integrated its sonar classification processors and tactical data recording systems into the augmented combat systems. Acoustic Technologies was also involved in the fast track project including development of the audio data management and sonar data recording systems for the augmented platforms. Sonartech provided the CS network ‘middleware’ managing the many CSA component modules, sensor and tactical data distribution.
The augmented system was to remain in service until the introduction of the replacement combat system. To retain the required higher level of capability in operational submarines, CSA equipment was subsequently relocated to other submarines throughout their docking programs. In total, CSA was installed in five submarines and had an operational life of nine years.
By October 2001 it was confirmed that the Australian submarines were to receive the same command and control system as the USN’s Virginia Class under the Replacement Combat System (RCS) program. This included delivery of the core US submarine combat system, the AN/BYG-1 Tactical Control System, which included transition to an MOU for ongoing AUS-US cooperative development, with future changes to reflect joint requirements.
The costly APB program
The AN/BYG-1 Tacitcal Control System has been described as a hot, heavy, hungry system and this country’s cash contribution to its development, production, and support is daunting for this Tactical C2 component of the Collins combat system.
Under the MOU, most recently signed off in 2009 and current for 15 years, Australian industry would be given the opportunity to provide input into improving the AN/BYG-1 Tactical Control System (TCS) through the Advanced Processor Builds (APB) program. Potential system enhancements and new fleet capabilities are evaluated for inclusion in the TCS system as part of the APB software development and fielding process. Hardware upgrades (Technology Insertions or TI’s) are also developed to provide improved capability and to address COTS obsolescence.
In response to US fleet concerns about the burden of tactics, training, and procedural changes associated with the rapid rate of change, the process was slowed down to deliver APBs and TIs biennially in odd and even years.
Such upgrades lie under the control of the US Navy’s PEO Submarines, Rear Admiral David Johnson, (who attended the recent SIA meeting in Fremantle) following recommendations from his Submarine Tactical Requirements Group which receives requests from the RAN for combat system improvements through Defence’s Capability Requirements Group. Implementation is the responsibility of GD-AIS as prime contractor for the AN/BYG-1.
US Navy OT&E reports have repeatedly highlighted critical capability gaps not being addressed by the APB program. While officials on both sides say these are not representative, in October 2014 GD-AIS was awarded $50 million for two contract modifications for architecture development and AN/BYG-1 TCS engineering support. GD-AIS has been awarded engineering support contracts for the AN/BYG-1 TCS on a number of occasions, totalling $228.37 million over a 12 year period. For example
2002: $63 million
2008: $66.2 million
2009: $21.3 million (first year of multi-year contract)
2012: $27.87 million
October 2014: $50 million.
The shortfalls are very significant, particularly in respect of Australian operational areas. Key issues are coping with high contact densities (ie keeping track of many contacts simultaneously) and the ability to deal with ‘close, high bearing rate contacts’ (ie tracking weapons).
Contact detection, localisation, tracking and classification performance are the core combat system capabilities. Under normal circumstances these roles are shared between the sonar and the tactical data systems, with the traditional function boundaries becoming somewhat blurred with the compilation of the tactical picture migrating to the sonar side, and the tactical system becoming more of a repository for firing solutions. It is noteworthy then that the crucial work for the tactical display has thus been performed in the sensor space. This is a more natural partitioning as this is where the detailed sensor and classification information is considered.
And herein lies the rub – since the MOU and TAA’s only cover tactical side developments, the Australian BYG-1 versions will not include any advances in high contact density and high bearing rate contact management that may have occurred on the sonar side.
Australian industry input to APB program
In view of the shortfalls in the performance of the AN/BYG-1, which appear to be particularly related to the operational interests of the RAN, what opportunities have Australian companies had in winning work under the APB program. Well, not very many, apparently.
In July 2008 Cirrus announced that it had been awarded a contract, relating to technologies in underwater localisation, under the APB process associated with the AN/BYG1 Combat Control System. In June 2013 Senate Estimates we learn that none of the four proposals submitted to the APB working group earlier that year had been accepted because they had not addressed the priorities established for ongoing development of the AN/BYG-1.
In the 2014 Senates Estimates we learnt that following the release of RFTs in April 2014, two small contracts were in place with Thales and Cirrus regarding the way data was displayed in BYG-1 modules. Cirrus later confirmed the contract was related to the development of functionality
While the AN/BYG-1 TCS appears to have shortcomings that one might expect could impact negatively on Australian operational requirements, such as those described above, we do not know to what extent the RAN has been able to have these or any other perceived problems, rectified through the APB program. Perhaps Australian approaches for improvements may be restricted both timewise and in capability, by the delays and higher priority needs of the US Navy, much of which may be largely irrelevant to Australian ASW operations.
There is another problem: it is clear that the US State Department will not allow any non-US owned contribution in any US platform mission system which suggests that the collaborative development of the AN/BYG-1 was going to be a farce.
What must be particularly galling to Ted Huber of Acacia Research is that a joint paper he presented to the SIA with Graham Smith of Lockheed Martin Australia, on Augmenting the AN/BYG-1 Tactical Control System through a local integration capability, has seemingly found little merit in official RAN circles.
A local integration facility could deal with in-country updates and development, such as those presented by routine operations, or by way of rapid science and technology (S&T) development and deployment, such as through the RPDE program.
“Given the sluggish pace of recent CS development and freely available access to relevant S&T publications, a shock awakening caused by some disruptive new technology or strategic development, requiring a rapid and focused response, is not an unlikely scenario.”
The paper presented two recent case studies covering integration of a new Mission Information Management System and successful integration of local, ‘third party’ applications in the Lockheed Martin Technology Validation Laboratory.
Despite this country’s proven ability to develop and deliver mission system equipment, it’s an element that will easily be let go to overseas suppliers. Australian smarts, which included optronics, sonar and weapon control, were a significant part of how the Oberons achieved capability advantage.
The future submarine combat system
While one might have hoped that with so many future submarine options now being proposed, some mature consideration might also be given to acquiring a new modern combat system, that could be shaped around this country’s particular requirements, including interoperability with the US and other coalition fleets/forces, and of course a weapons control system suited to both US and other weapons systems.
At latest SIA conference (see PXX for more), RADM Greg Sammut made it quite clear that the AN/BYG-1 tactical and weapon control system and the Mk 48 Mod 7 heavyweight torpedo would feature in the combat system of the future submarine, but made no comment regarding the sonar and other vital sensors and systems that make up the existing Collins combat system. Does this mean the USN is showing interest in this country adopting the USN’s ARCI BQQ-10 sonar system as well as the TCS?
Conclusion
Our feeling is that carrying the BYG-1 into the future submarine would not be the right course of action. It should be an informed decision made after conducting a robust assessment of competing systems. It is not appropriate for it to continue on the basis of past agreements – that no longer add up – or that millions of dollars have already been spent on the US system (this country’s financial contributions to what is virtually the upkeep of a US system, are detailed in the MOU).
The reality is that there has been no benchmarking of the AN/BYG-1 system since it failed to be selected through an open competition in 2000. There were expectations that with investment it could be brought up to the same standard as the
ISUS-55 but has it? Aversion to its re-evaluation could well be because of the fear it would lose again.
As the quality and quantity of sensors improve, the need to effectively manage the data and workflow increases. Effectively integrated systems, which have integrated the workflow, are a significant part of this.
As this government properly decides on the number and type of submarines it wants to suit Australian sovereign requirements, let’s hope that this same independent attitude will continue in its choice of combat system and those who will support it.